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Ethnic diversity is an ongoing topic of economic research that has been 
researched both macroeconomically and microeconomic and is an important 
topic among policymakers. There is still a mixture of published findings on the 
economic impacts of ethnic diversity, indicating the need for further empirical 
research into the possible benefits of ethnic diversity. Ethnic diversity refers to a 
place or an environment that comprises people with ethnic backgrounds that are 
different. Finland as a country possesses a population estimated to be 5.53 million 
people, and the population density on average is 19 inhabitants within one square 
kilometer (Bauer, 2019). The population density makes Finland the third country 
within Europe, sparsely populated after Iceland, with Norway in second place. 
The population distribution across this country is uneven, implying that its 
concentration is along the small coastal plain in the southwestern part. The 
percentage of 85% dwells in towns and cities with a population of 1.5 million 
people living in Greater Helsinki place (Bauer, 2019). When it comes to the area 
of Arctic Lapland, it is estimated that on every square km, there live two people 
on only.  
 
Generally, we consider the company to be strongly related to the 
entrepreneur's character. Researchers view an entrepreneur as a person with 
different skills: risk-taker, innovative, good manager, dealer, and so on. 
Therefore, when people are all different by gender, social-cultural background, 
or education, a difference in entrepreneurial motivations or/and in skills or 
behaviors. In general, the various social and cultural groups make up each 
society. Some authors then discuss diversity as a range that can be assessed 
according to racial, ethnic, gender, sexual orientation, social and economic 
conditions, age, physical ability, religious beliefs, political beliefs or other 
ideology (Baycan-Levent et al., 2003). Diversity also includes visible features, 
including nationality, ethnicity, gender and age, as well as unseen features such 




disability as a diversity factor if this population can be discriminated against in 
certain societies. 
 
The role of diversity in boosting innovation is highlighted by Eraydin et 
al. (2010). They quote Fainstein (2005) for stating that 'forms of human capital' 
are attracted by multiple forms of social, cultural, ethnic and spatial diversity and, 
of course, promote cultural and artistic creation and technological and scientific 
innovation.' But some authors regard diversity as a competitive factor. Amin and 
Graham (1997) say that the city never was a homogenous organization, and 
social, cultural and ethnic forms of diversity always play an important part in 
urban research. The processes of globalization, neo liberalization and economic 
restructuring have led to considerable increases in migration in many urban 
centers in the advanced economies (Eraydin et al., 2010). 
 
Efendic et al. (2015) found that ethnic diversity is benefit for young 
companies. Young companies (entrepreneurs) are systematically more likely 
than in ethnically homogenous areas to grow in local and ethnically diverse areas. 
These findings are of great importance in cross-country economic literature, as 
this latter suggests that ethnic heterogeneity can be linked to adverse economic 
consequences (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997, Collier 1998, Easterly 2001, 
Patsiurko et al. 2012). However, Finland is an ethnically homogeneous country, 
and the dominant ethnicity is Finnish. It is also dominated by some Roma, Sami, 
and the Finish-Swedes people who the minority groups within the country. Due 
to the impact of the recent immigration, there is the presence of large ethnic 
groups, and these are Russians, Somalis, Kurds, and Estonians. In the study 
carried out on this population, 7.9% is born from abroad, and foreign citizens 
comprise 5.2% (Bauer, 2019). Two languages are official within this country, 
and these are the Finn alongside the Swedish. However, the Finn is the native and 
spoken by over 5.2% of the population in Finland. In the period between the 





In most advanced economies since around 1970 (Alderson and Nielsen 
2002; Atkinson 2004), interest in determinants of income inequity, mostly 
measured as the Gini index was driven by the trend towards greater inequality. 
There are still no reasons for this trend. One option is that rising income 
inequality can be linked to the increasing cultural or racial heterogeneity of 
numerous national populations. A recent transversal study showed population 
diversity as a determinant of the Gini index. 
 
Finland’s Gini ratio as of 2021 is 0.274 and between 0.25 0.26 in the past 
15 years has remained stable. In 1999, the Gini ratio in Finland reached 0.25 and 
remained higher than 0.25 until. The World Bank says that the Gini ratio between 
Asian countries is very high at 0.4, which is alarming. For example, one of 
Indonesia's key policy issues is how to reduce inequality. Higher inequality 
affects economically both positively and negatively (Alesina, Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou, 2016). The negative aspect of increased inequality is that it 
increases conflicts and crimes, prevents the poor from receiving education, and 
raises tax rates for groups with higher rates of income so that it can lead to lower 
levels of investment in the case of developing nations. On the other hand, country 
such as the United States with a GINI ratio of over 0.4 implies a higher inequality 
may create an economic environment that promotes innovation and 
entrepreneurship, and in turn encourages economic development.  
 
In addition to the inequality between income and expenditure, Easterly 
and Levine (1997) argued that a different factor affected economic performance, 
namely ethnic diversity. They found that there is a significant negative 
relationship between ethnic diversity and economic output in Africa, which is 
linked to the poorer economic performance of a greater level of ethnic diversity. 
This study led to research into the interaction between ethnic diversity, inequality 
at the upper-bound, and Entrepreneurial Activities in Finland in comparison to 





Motivated by those findings, the researcher explores the relationship 
between ethnic diversity, entrepreneurship, and the selected macroeconomic 
variables that include interest rate and income inequality. Their research shall 
fully explore the topic by comparing Finland and the US. This study contributes 
to existing knowledge by investigating the effect of ethnic diversity GINI index 
and inequality at the top-end distribution of Finland economy and its relationship 
with entrepreneurial activities. The study proxy entrepreneurship using the total 
entrepreneurship index data from the world bank database. The choice of 
proxying the Total Entrepreneurial Activities is that the TEA is function of both 
Innovation and operations from all groups of the population. 
 
1.1. Problem Statement 
Finland is one of the European countries with a small population of 5.518 
million, according to statistics released in the year 2019. The country consists of 
various groups of people, which considers the immigrants and the natives. The 
research carried out by different authors, and government reports indicate that 
entrepreneurship within this country is practiced at a higher level. In this, three 
different types of business are operated by entrepreneurs, and these include small 
scale, middle-sized, and large-scale enterprises. For this reason, the research 
wants to find out whether ethnicity has something to do with the entrepreneurship 
level in this country and the extent of this influence. Finland is counted among 
European countries that are characterized by income inequality. The research 
aims to determine the effect of ethnic diversity on this variable and its influence 
on other economic variables like the interest rate.  
1.2. Objectives of the Study 
The research aims at fulfilling some specific objectives, and these include the 
following.  
• To determine the relationship between Income inequality at the Upper-




• To measure the trends of Ethnic diversity on Income Inequality in other 
to determine if it promotes Entrepreneurship Activities. 
• To investigate the factors accounting for increasing disparities in 
inequality levels of Finland and the United States despite the huge level 
of industrialization in both countries. 
 
1.3. Research Questions 
• What is the relationship between Inequality, Ethnic Diversity and 
Entrepreneurial Activities? 
• To what extent does Ethnic diversity and Inequality at Upper/Bound 
promote entrepreneurship? 
• What variables accounts for the disparities in Entrepreneurship Activities 
between the two countries (United States and Finland)?  
1.4. Significance of the Study 
The study is a variety of importance, and some of them include the following.  
Through the study, we shall be able to discover the influence of ethnic 
diversity on entrepreneurship within Finland. As seen in the introduction, 
different groups of people come from different origins within this country. Some 
of these, as earlier mentioned, include the Swedish, Russians, among others, 
alongside the natives of this country. Since the level of entrepreneurship is 
observed to be high in this nation, the research shall enable us to find out the role 
of ethnic diversity in the development of entrepreneurship in this country.  
Secondly, the research will help us to discover how entrepreneurial 
activities influence ethnic diversity within the Finnish economy. There can be no 
question of the presence of different groups of people with various backgrounds 
in Finland having significant effects on entrepreneurial development. However, 




will allow us to detect the extent of this impact. This influence can be 
significantly reduced. 
Other economies are so important for Finland's economy, and the 
researchers have decided to look at just two. These include inequality, the upper 
limits and the rate of interest. As the introduction states, the country is known to 
be among the countries with upper inequality and this inequality has been going 
on for a long time. Research will help us to fully understand whether the 
prevalence of this inequality is related to ethnic diversity, as the country has 
various backgrounds. In addition, there has been an unstable interest rate in the 
country. The research will enable us to understand the relationship between 
Income inequality, GINI and ethnic diversity. The study also allows us to make 
important policy recommendations. These recommendations are made based on 
the results and analysis of the data collected for the study. Therefore, we shall 
make the relevant recommendations by identifying the relationship and impacts 
that exists between ethnic diversity, inequality at upper-bound (top 1%), GINI 
and entrepreneurship. 
1.5 Limitations of the Study 
One important limitation of this study is that a relation can never create a causal 
connection. The theory behind the empirically tested phenomenon must 
demonstrate or deduce causality (Kendal & Stuart, 1961). Although all measures 
to mitigate (but not remove) the potentially endogenous nature between those 
variables and the Gini index are postponed over a year, it is important to recall 
that this survey aims to test the relationship between income inequality and 
enterprise, rather than eliminate it. 
Additional limitations of the study are the research period, as the new rules of 
COVID-19 still apply. The outbreak of the pandemic around the world has led to 
new laws including limiting group reunification, social distance and masks. The 




the opportunity of adding a qualitative technique, using one-on-one interviews 
and focused groups to the study. 
1.6 Contribution To Existing Knowledge 
Ethnic diversity was previously studied primarily within ethnic heterogeneity due 
to immigration and the influx of people into previously homogenous areas of 
various cultures and traditions. This research addresses the effects of economic 
change in the opposite direction: shifting to a new characteristic of much 
homogenisation, largely exogenous by violence (Malcolm 1996). Therefore, the 
results of this study affect societies faced with similar changes. Our study 
supports some authors' opinions about the possible connections between business 
and income inequality (Reynolds, Hay, and Bygrave 2002; Lippmann, Davis, and 
Aldrich 2005; Stiglitz 2012). It also offers an insight into the mechanisms by 
which ethnic diversity and inequality govern the role of economic development 
in entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, empirical models apply to two groups 
of high-income countries. This indicates that the different levels of 
entrepreneurship in the various income groups in countries vary. 
The study also helps to examine the link between ethnic diversity, 
entrepreneurship activities and inequality in both countries as a first study in 
existing literature. We are documenting the impact on a wide range of ethnic 
diversity, macroeconomics, formal institutions and business indicators. 
Understanding this relationship is important as it adds to the literature on how the 
country's diversion is understood and addressed. The researcher points out that 
socio-political factors such as ethnic diversity play a key role, not only in 
explaining inequity differences across countries, but also in economic factors 
such as economic and institutional growth. 
We also contribute to this literature by extending the Finnish Entrepreneurship 
Study on Inequality, which resembles the United States, but is more stable during 
the period considered here. We think that studying the case of Finland gives an 




finding has major political consequences. The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, to alleviate poverty, encouraged countries to implement 
economic policy reforms, including privatization and price and trade 
liberalisation. The findings of this study show that in addition to these economic 
factors ethnic diversity, which has not been a primary consideration in poverty 
reduction policies, should be taken into consideration. As Miguel (2006) states, 
"The bottom line is that in countries with deep social divisions, good economic 
policy alone may not be sufficient to reduce poverty." As well as the usual 
requirement for good economic policies, "national development" policies that 
promote the development of a common national identity could also be necessary 
to reduce the effects of fractionalization on poverty (Miguel, 2006) 
1.7 Organization of The Study 
The thesis structure is divided into five chapters. In the next section of this first 
chapter the main concepts of this study are presented: ethnic business, growth 
orientation, ethnic views, growth strategies and obstacles. Chapter two discusses 
a theoretical framework and literature for this study on ethnic diversity, 
Inequality and entrepreneurship. The methodological approach, the data 
collection and analysis methods for that study are described in Chapter Three. 
The empirical results of this study are presented in Chapter Four and the summary 












This section of the paper examines the subject under study by examining 
other literature. The search was made in various academic databases for this 
literature, with a variety of literature. ResearchGate, Google Scholar, JSTOR, 
Scopus, NBER, and BASE were the sources of the research. A total of 120 items 
were obtained in this document. We received 20 pieces from ResearchGate, 15 
from the Google scholar, 15 from the JSTOR, 15 from the Scopus 10, 50 from 
NBER, and 10 from BASE. The number of 90 pieces remained and the remaining 
30 were eliminated according to the criteria of inclusion and exclusion. The 
articles excluded from the study wandered away from the topic being studied and 
the research lacks reliability and validity, if such articles are included in the 
research. The articles included in the survey are studies recently conducted by 
the different researchers and continue to flow completely according to the topic. 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The following contradiction has been formulated by Kreutzmann (2008) 
in connection with the widening inequality gap: the impossible to catch-up 
among underdeveloped nations has become so fixed that it is acceptable for new 
exclusions and dependencies to occur. The contravention of Kreutzmann (2008) 
is based on the rich and richer theory (RGR), which is based in turn on the design 
model. The designalizing model argues according to Ljungqvist (1993) that, 
while all households are initially equal, inequalities will occur in the long run, as 
these households must choose occupations with different entry cost. With 
increasing inequalities, the accumulation of wealth results in further company 
creation (Ragoubi & El Harbi, 2017). This relationship becomes negative (a 
reverse U-shaped relationship between entrepreneurship and income inequality) 
after reaching a certain threshold of inequality (Kuznets, 1995). 
The relations between entrepreneurship and income inequalities were also 




promoting entrepreneurship increase inequality and could damage Shane's 
growth (2009). Business entrepreneurship may well, for many reasons, amplify 
wealth inequalities in societies. Lippmann, Davis & Aldrich (2005), for example, 
explained that the highest rates of entrepreneurial activity are for countries with 
increased income inequality because 'those at the top of the income distribution 
have surplus capital to invest in new companies. By contrast, self-employment is 
the only viable form of employment for many in societies in which large 
segments of the population do not have enough financial resources. 
 
Meh, (2005) argues further those employers have higher savings rates 
than workers, particularly because businessmen have to save more because their 
income is irregular (Carter, 2011). The various savings patterns between 
employers and employees, in turn, lead to increased assets and an increased 
concentration of riches among the companies throughout the distribution process. 
To support wealth accumulation, Quadrini (1999) proposes that former 
generations of wealthier families are more likely than previous generations to be 
characterized by people engaged in entrepreneurial activities. As the wealth 
accumulated in the periods of business is normally not depleted immediately, 
these entrepreneurial families have more resources for starting or restarting 
companies. These characteristics of entrepreneurial family dynamics strengthen 
the idea that a person has inherited wealth because initial capital is necessary for 
new enterprises to develop Holtz-Eakin et al., (1994 and 1994). 
 
The argument for inheritance is important because wealthy individuals 
have more substantial financial resources that increase the likelihood of self-
employment Fairlie & Krashinsky, (2012). They have the resources to engage in 
bigger undertakings before using external funding sources to overcome liquidity 
constraints Bhide, (2000). These characteristics of entrepreneurial family 
dynamics strengthen the idea that a person has inherited wealth because initial 






The argument for inheritance is important because wealthy individuals 
have more substantial financial resources that increase the likelihood of self-
employment Fairlie & Krashinsky, (2012). They have the resources to engage in 
bigger undertakings before using external funding sources to overcome liquidity 
constraints Bhide, (2000). Reduced liquidity restrictions in turn allow rich 
businesses to be more affordable Cassar, (2006). Tamvada (2010) also found 
patterns of unequal income distribution among entrepreneurs, since the highest 
rates in terms of consumption are those people who hire others. Thus, increasing 
growth can be a better way to reduce inequality than encouraging 
entrepreneurship, as most self-employed and small entrepreneurs earn lower 
profits than average workforce (Hamilton, 2000). 
 
Likewise, Frid, Wyman and Coffey (2016) demonstrate that theory of 
liquidity restrictions shows that low-income entrepreneurs and moderately 
wealthy entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints and are much more l ikely to 
breaking away during gestation from the startup process. But once the process of 
gestation is over, a new undertaking has no influence on its success. These 
authors therefore show that, while the opportunity is not, talent is evenly 
distributed. In the face of rising income disparities, according to Xavier-Oliveira, 
Laplume and Pathak (2015), 'more people pursue entrepreneurship whatever the 
nature of motivations, though the majority should be driven by push factors that 
will improve their economy' Reynolds et al. (2005)). This argument supports 
further the use of different measures of entrepreneurship as the formal, informal 
and highly aspiring entrepreneurs are expected to achieve different results. 
 
Cultural theory suggests that ethnic groups and immigrants have a 
culture-driven approach, such as a strong ethnic community membership, 
economic life, accepting risk, compliance with social value patterns, solidarity 
and loyalty, and self-employment orientation Masurel et al. (2004). These 




ethnic self-employed people Fregetto, (2004). Ethnics often come to know the 
benefits of their own culture only after they arrive in the new environment: 
"Whether English, Suomi or Sweedish, it is an act in itself which is likely to 
increase a sense of cultural and national identity to a new society with alien 
customs and incomprehensible language" Jones and McEvoy, (1986: 199). 
The differences in ethnic resources also explain different self-
employment rates among equally deprived ethnic groups Waldinger et al., 
(1990). Cultural aspects, for instance, are especially popular in order to explain 
Asians' tendency to become self-employed. Many observers believe that the 
strong presence of Asian people in the food industry determines their 
participation in these economic sectors due to a predisposition of their culture 
Leung, (2002). However, new studies have tried to show that such hypothesis has 
not considered other crucial aspects of a complex phenomenon, such as job 
alternatives, immigration policies, market conditions and capital availability. 
2.2 Conceptual Review 
2.2.1 Ethnic Diversity 
Economics has oftern proxyed the Ethnic Diversity of a country using the Ethnic 
Fragmantation indexes that usually measure diversity as the constantly growing 
number of groups in a given country. They are based on the likelihood that two 
persons from a country belong to two distinct groups. In theory, the fractions 
range between 0 (all people are members of the same group) and 1 (when 
everyone belongs to his or her own group). Polarization indices, by contrast, 
measure the probability of a potential conflict between two equal groups. There 
were also initiatives to overcome simple disunion measures, focusing on the 
intersection of ethnic diversity and economic inequity or the combination of five 
cleavages, that is the race, language, religion, region and income. This index 
combines the intersection between the ethnic diversities and economic 




groups, the historical depth of ethnic divisions or consider individuals rather than 
groups' heterogeneity. 
2.2.2 Income Inequality at Top One Percent 
In defining Income, we include revenues from wages, saving-account interest, 
stock dividends, rent, and earnings from something for more than you have been 
paying for it. In contrast to weight statistics, the value of homes, inventory or 
other holdings does not include income figures. Inequality of income refers to the 
extent to which revenues in a population are distributed unevenly. Economic 
inequality, significant disparity in income distribution among individuals, 
groups, populations, social classes or countries. Understanding the Income 
inequality at top 1% as the inequality between income and social class is a key 
aspect of social stratification. Many other inequalities, such as wealth 
inequalities, political authority and social status affect them and are affected. 
Taking Income as a key determinant of the quality of life, affecting people and 
families' health and well-being and varies according to social factors such as 
gender, age, race and ethnicity. 
Revenue is defined as disposable household revenue each year. This includes 
income, self-employment, equity income, and public money transfers, household 
payments in respect of income taxes and social security contributions. The 
household's earnings are attributable to each member, adapting the needs of 
different sizes of households to reflect differences.  
Given the continued increase in income inequality globally over the past few 
decades, this issue is increasingly prominent in current public discourse and 
academic studies. The increasing inequality of revenues is partly due to higher 
top incomes between the 1970s and the 1990s Piketty Saez, (2006) and has 
proved to have an impact on economic growth, social capital and social cohesion 
Kuznets, (1955). Kennedy et al., (1998). Entrepreneurship and Ethnic Diversity, 
which is the focus of the paper, can also be affected by income inequality. The 




comparison with the cumulative proportions of income they receive in the 
population, the Gini coefficient varies from zero in the event of perfect equality 
to 1 in the case of perfect inequality. 
2.2.3 Entrepreneurship  
Entrepreneurship refers to the process that involves the creation of value. 
In this definition, the concept is observed as a change that considers the entailing 
of above the normal circumstance which is encountered in the process of starting 
up a business, and this may take into consideration other values instead of the 
economic ones that are known Suomalainen et al., (2016). In economics, an 
entrepreneur involves the ability to translate inventions into goods or services, 
which further describes activities carried out by the new businesses and those 
already in existence Suomalainen et al., (2016). The principal difficulty of the 
analysis of entrepreneurship is its definition of restriction. This concept is not 
broadly defined. Wennekers and Thurik (1999) define business enterprises as 
following ‘the concepts put forward by certain authors (Hebert and Link 1989; 
Bull and Willard 1993; Lumpkin and Dess 1996): the manifest capacities of 
individuals to create new business opportunities - new products, new forms of 
organization, new methods of production... and to bring their ideas to markets 
faced with uncertainty’. 
 
Modern thinking about innovation and entrepreneurship owes what 
Schumpeter proposed in the beginning of the 20th Century to the theoretical 
perspectives and evolution. Schumpeter's thoughts on innovation and 
entrepreneurship influenced modern economy while being world-renowned for 
analysing the business cycle during capitalist change. The starting point for 
Schumpeter is an economy that is not expected to change (though not growth) 
Sweezy (1943). The capitalist economy is a "circular flow," conceived as an 
abstract construction that aims to illustrate the effects of a limited number of 
actual economic forces Sweezy, (1943). There are however suggestions that the 




OECD report, Innovation will increase inequality in the traditional 
Schumpeterian environment, as benefits only benefit innovators and possibly 
their customers. " (OECD, 2012). Consequently, this section defines innovation 
and entrepreneurship inclusive and how these relate to discussions about 
innovation in the South. 
 
The decisions could be taken separately or in networks that are or are not 
part of the institutions. Further, Ahmad and Hoffman (2008) describe enterprise 
as the entrepreneurial phenomenon that is the entrepreneurial human action in 
pursuance of value generation, the creation or expansion of economic activity, 
the identification and exploitation of new products, processes or markets. 
Government analysts and policy makers need sound, rather comparable, country-
specific statistical indicators in order to understand the entrepreneurship. In order 
to establish a solid basis for policy formulation and monitoring, some enterprise 
measures are developed by the OECD Eurostat Entrepreneurship Indicators 
Programme (Ahmad and Seymour 2008; Lunati, zu Schlochtern, and Sargsyan 
2010).  
Furthermore, GEM offers harmonized data on entrepreneurial activity, 
comparable internationally, and includes various undertakings based on a study, 
known as the Adult Population Survey. The GEM project is an important research 
tool that enables entrepreneurship scholars to tackle the problems of 
entrepreneurship measurement throughout countries. However, the operation and 
implementation of these measures is not ideal and can be improved, as is any 
other measure. 
 
The World Bank's Doing Business Report, which contains Total Business 
Density, Entry Density, and Entry Rates (Klapper, Guillén and Quesada 2007; 
Klapper, Amit and Guillén 2010), proposes a further set of business-leverage 
indicators. The total business density reflects the level of business formation and 
is calculated as a percentage of the active population (ages 15-64) in this year as 




density rates are calculated as a percentage of working-age new enterprises 
(which have been registered during the current year). As a new registration of 
companies, new entry rates shall be calculated as a percentage of total registered 
companies (last year). 
 
2.2.3.1 Entrepreneurship Activities in Finland 
Entrepreneurship is regarded in Finland as the cornerstone of their 
economy, and statistics show that over 292.377 enterprises do not consider 
fishing, forestry or agriculture. These firms employ over 1,5 million people, and 
they also pay taxes to increase the financing of services every single person in 
this country uses (Statistics Finland, 2017). Small and medium-sized enterprises 
have provided Finnish people with many job opportunities throughout the 21st 
century. Over 160,646 jobs were created by small enterprises alone and between 
2001 and 2019. In relation to these jobs, companies with a population of less than 
50 employees created 81,095 opportunities. 
 
In the total turnover of the companies within the Finnish economy, small 
and medium-sized enterprises account for over 57,5% of the 445 BN euros. Their 
GPD share is generally 40% higher than (Statistics Finland, 2017). In Finland, 
companies with fewer than 10 employees are known as micro-businesses, and 
companies with fewer than 50 employees are called small businesses. In contrast, 
medium-sized companies are those who employ between 50 and 249. Companies 
with more than 250 employees are called large companies (PwC, 2017). Overall, 
the proportive figure of 93%, representing a total of 271,851 companies with 
fewer than ten employees, is 16,630 small businesses, a 5,7%, medium-sized 
businesses, which comprises 1.1% and a total of 3,214 and 0.2%, and a total of 
672 firms (PwC, 2017). 
 
Finland's government's political priority is to promote entrepreneurship. 
The policy is designed to guarantee "a competitive country in Finland by the year 




and where work and employment in Finland are always more profitable" 
(Statistics Finland, 2017). In support of the policy, the government launched a 
program called the "Entrepreneurship Pact," which provides integrated support 
alongside the removal of entrepreneurial barriers (Statistics Finland, 2017). 
 
This package, which focuses on new forms of entrepreneurship and 
working methods, such as a platform economy, a collaborational economy, self-
employment alongside various business combinations and paid employment, was 
updated by the government and released in 2017. (2017). In 2012, the European 
Commission drafted an Entrepreneurship Action Plan in 2020 calling on Member 
States to pay particular attention to groups which are disadvantaged on the labor 
market. Such groups include young people, the unemployed, women, elderly 
people, immigrants and disabled people. Despite this, Finland's entrepreneurial 
policies have not been defined, but rather are more generic in their nature than 
constructed activities for these groups. Okzane (2017). 
 
In line with the EU's 2020 targets, the Government of Finland identified 
national targets. Finland as a country aims to achieve a rate of employment of 
between 20 and 64 years with a national level of 78 percent, which goes beyond 
the European Union's 75 percent target (Statistics Finland, 2017). In addition, the 
Government of Finland is aiming at reducing by 150,000 the population of people 
living at risk of poverty. The promotion of entrepreneurship within disadvantaged 
groups and groups contributes to the attainment of these objectives. 
 
2.2.4 Ethnic Diversity and Interest Rate 
The research that aims to determine the existing relationship between 
economic and ethnic fractionalisation has been increasing in recent years. The 
study found that GDP per capita growth has a reverse relation to the degree of 
ethnic breakup using Narodov Mira Alas ethnic measures (Yusuf, Sumner, & 




poor because of the large ethnic groups who live in the same country. Some, on 
the other hand, live along the borders drawn by their former colonial rulers. 
 
Ethnic fragmentation is found to be weaker when it comes to controlling 
other factors such as economic indicators, political stability and human capital. 
This is because the variables in standard growth in the regression were the 
transmission channels for the indirect impact of ethnic division on economic 
growth (Yusuf, Sumner, & Rum, 2014). It states whether the highly 
fractionalized societies are indirectly affected by the government's unsatisfactory 
performance. Although the researchers tackled this major problem with ethnic 
splitting and government performance indicators, they also provided the only 
independent variable for the regression of these indicators of ethnic splitting. 
The research concluded that ethnic spread is the result of poor school 
achievement, quality of infrastructure and financial depth. Moreover, they have 
revealed that ethnic division causes higher market distortions, resulting from the 
black-market premium (Savelkoul, Gesthuizen, & Scheepers, 2011). A more 
extensive analysis has been carried out regarding the ethnic breakdown along 
with the quality of the government. In this research, researchers have investigated 
the effect of the wider range of factors on sound government performance. The 
researchers said that economic institutions, particularly in the public sector, 
encourage GPD per capita growth when good. The trial can be made possible by 
controlling and reducing the private influence of the government and by 
establishing an uncorrupted bureaucracy and the legal system to defend and 
enforce property rights. The scientists also noted that the government's inferior 
performance is demonstrated in fractional ethnic societies. 
 
The findings also show that ethnically fractionated societies are affected 
by unfavorable public sector performance and in turn, economic performance is 
decreasing (Schündeln, 2013). The updated analysis of the above results was 
conducted to provide new ethnic measures, linguistic level, divided levels and 




for not distinguishing ethnic from linguistic difference, using ethnolinguist 
measurements derived from the Narodov Mira Atlas. This may seem 
unproblematic in Africa and in Europe where ethnicity and language identify 
people (Schündeln, 2013). This is not true, however, for countries in South 
America where language terms are increasingly uniform. They speak, for 
example, Portuguese or Spanish, but differently in terms of ethnicity. 
 
There has also been another investigator who repeated the regression 
based on their ethnic fractionality, which depends rather than linguistic 
differences on ethnic distinctions. They exerted complete control of the variable, 
which is interpreted as the means by which growth such as infrastructure quality, 
government consumption, education quality, and others are influenced by 
ethnical fractionalisation. Due to this control, the magnitude of the ethnic effect 
was lost and statistically insignificant, which implies that ethnic breakup again 
might have an indirect impact on economic performance via the channels. 
Leaving the distortions of the market variable, the authors discovered the existing 
relationship that is statistically significant, using the similar econometric  
specification used by Levine in 1997, between ethnic fractions along with 
training, depth, political stability, infrastructure quality and fiscal surpluses 
towards GDP. The specific narrow transmission channels, however, lead to 
guessing. The conjecture is the estimated effect of ethnic fractionalisation when 
every specific open channel of transmission suffers from the prejudices of 
omitted variables (Ratna, Grafton, & To, 2017). 
 
When the channels of transmission are not well specified, the researchers 
did not clearly indicate the elements captured through a fractionalization 
measure. Moreover, the researchers could not clarify the importance of every 
communication channel to the development of ethnically divided countries. In 
addition to its severe effect on economic performance, another piece of literature 
investigates ethnic violence in particular civil wars. Ratna, Grafton, and To 




development when nations are highly ethniccal wars. The authors found that the 
exchange of thoughts is delayed in heterogeneous societies, especially if different 
groups conflict. Companies cannot operate where ethnic violence prevails, as all 
economic activity at each level has repercussions. 
 
Empirical research carried out by different researchers on this problem 
found no positive link between the incidence of civil war and ethnic division 
(Vermeulen, Tillie, & Van de Walle, 2012). Rather, these authors found that the 
high ethnic fractionalization creates security in society as the cost of coordination 
increases. No ethnic group is sufficiently large and strong to dominate others. 
Another study disregarded ethnic fractionalization and pointed to polarization 
among the major factors affecting the civil war. Sadly, the measure of ethnic 
division cannot contain ethnic polarization between the various countries. The 
authors based on their research indicated that the violence is less prevalent in 
highly fractionalized and uniform societies and the civil war impacts in cultures 
where the non-denied group is dominated by the ruling ethnic group (Smallbone 
et al., 2010). Instead of fractionalization, such cases must be measured through 
polarization to capture the latent danger of the ethnic conflict.  
 
In 1997 Levine and Easterly applied the ethnic fractionation measures to 
the same problem, although they mentioned the potentially ethnic polarization-
related effects on growth policy (Sluiter, Tolsma, &Scheepers, 2015). Easterly 
and Levine addressed its empirical qualifications directly, though ethnicity is 
known to directly impact economic growth. In 2005, Garcia-Montalvo&Reynal-
Querol took the first step to assess the quantitative performance of transmission 
channels in which change is indirectly affecting ethnicity (Chaston, 2012). The 
researchers specified and estimated a comprehensive system of equations to 
determine the growth alongside the transmission channels, which could affect 
ethnic polarization and fractionalization (Vermeulen, Tillie, & Van de Walle, 




polarization. It leads to lower investment rates and higher consumption and the 
incidence of civil war. 
On the other hand, the researchers' findings suggested that the ethnic 
fractionalisation via such channels does not indirectly affect growth. Instead, for 
example, the company does this directly through reducing the economic 
exchange of ideas. These researchers discovered that the researchers opposed the 
Easter and Levine estimates in 1997, which established a negative relationship 
between political stability and fiscal position, on the one hand, and ethnic 
division. 
2.2.4.1 Finland's Interest Rate 
The present exceptionally low interest rates encourage price stability in 
conjunction with economic growth in different European countries, but they also 
undermine retail banking profitability. In Finland's economy, the main source of 
bank income and net interest on payment are now under pressures from different 
directions which are simultaneously different. Low interest rates have resulted in 
the spread of credit rates alongside credit (Blinder, 2012). At the same time, the 
loan stocks and deposit rose at a lower rate. The low interest rates have reduced 
customers' debt maintenance expenditure, but this can also mask risks. 
 
The European Central Bank has launched several measures to pursue its 
price stability objectives and to support economic recovery across different 
European countries. The fall in the key ECB interest rates forced the market's 
short-term interest rates to fall exceptionally below zero (Goodhart, 2013). The 
example is that Euribors remained in negative territory for the three months 
following the spring of 2015. In February 2016, the preferred rate for Finnish 
housing loans and in February 2016 was best known. 
 
The interest rate cut was quickly and strongly greater than on average 
across other European countries than the interest paid and received by bank 
customers in Finland. This is because the bulk of loans to domestic and non-




which usually follow the market interest rates; however, this may be short-term 
(Bauer, 2019). The variable rates are inherent to half and more deposits that come 
from the public hands. 
 
The profitability of financial intermediation is based primarily on the 
interest rate spread between loans and expenditures. The spread of interest rate 
between the loan stocks and the deposit as the general margin typically increases 
because of different relationships between the interest rate and reduces in 
response to the fall in interest rates. the interim rate increases (Bauer, 2019). The 
interest spread has historically been small for a long period regarding Finland's 
economy; however, since autumn 2012 it has not been significantly reduced. 
While this spread is expected to continue if the average interest rate on the loan 
stock remains lower when we look to the times to come, the banks still retain the 
retail interest rates along with the minimum zero level (PwC, 2017). 
 
In this country, market-based funding from banks has recently declined, 
providing aid to mitigate the severe effects on the profitability of banking 
resulting from low interest rates. The lower return on the bonds issued by the 
Finnish bank reflects both the financial situation and the excellent credibility 
within the international investor perspective of Finland's banks (Bauer, 2019). In 
recent years, the share of long-term debt tools in bank funding has increased, 
while that of short-term debt instruments decreased, whereas the share of deposits 
remained virtually unchanged. 
 
In Finland, retail bank accounts constitute a large part of the operations 
of the banks. The existence of such a reason has an impact on the profitability of 
banking on the existing margin between interest expenditure and interest income 
(PwC, 2017). In recent years, net revenues earned by interest were subject to 
various pressures. During this same period, the loan stock experienced growth at 
a lower rate, irrespective of extremely low interest rates. There is evidence that 




the household's deposit stock remained standing for four years. The interest 
income generated on bank liquidity buffers recently decreased when banks 
increased their shares in liquid assets that contain high-quality in their coatings 
according to the requirements of the LCR "Liquidity Coverage Ratio" (PwC, 
2017). 
 
Since the autumn of 2014, net interest income for the banking sector has 
been falling steadily and continuously and contracting at 5.4 percent in 2015. 
(Oksanen, 2017). In 2008, net interest income reached a peak of 4,5 BN Euros, 
with interest rates considered to be higher than the current situation during that 
period. In 2015, interest revenues were recorded at only EUR 2.8 BN (Oksanen, 
2017). Net income was reduced on interest compared to the size of the balance 
sheet in the banking sector. The substantial change reflects the reduction in loans 
and deposits in the balance of the banking sector and the increase in derivatives 
that generate other revenues. 
 
However, in spite of its operation under the challenging environment and 
the other European banks, the profitability of Finnish banks is generally good. 
The banks in Finland compensated for the lower net interest earnings by 
increasing other earnings that allowed the industry to increase its income by a 
3.9% in 2015. (Oksanen, 2017). The growth of profits has been strongly 
supported by the high net income from trade, investment and net income. The net 
income derived from the financial and insurance conglomerates in the insurance 
business also provides a further boost to other income. 
 
The lower interest rates contributed significantly to the sustained small 
amount of assets and non-performing credit losses. This has given the bank 
exceptional benefit support, but this involves a certain amount of risk (PwC, 
2017). The low interest rates and the interest-only periods given by the banks to 




is weakened. Potential payment defaults will not take place until interest rates 
increase along with periods ending at interest only. 
 
2.2.5 Ethnic Diversity and Income Inequality  
During early antiquities, a Greek Socrates, in his words, said that "nothing 
is to be preferred before justice"(Chaganti & Greene, 2002). The equal 
distribution of income is the true dream in the heart of humanity, and it was the 
main reason for the outbreak of various revolutions alongside uprisings where 
populations lost lives while insisting on one because it was the equal distribution 
of wealth and also, this was seen as a sign for liberty and human respect. Basing 
on the formation of enterprise, the capitalist system dominating the world is 
generally accused of creating inequality. At the same time, there is general 
support and a positive mind towards entrepreneurship in the current situation. 
              The governments across different parts of the world in the current 
situation focus on the promotion of enterprise created to achieve profitable 
growth. In this perspective, the entrepreneurs are taken to be changing agents due 
to their ability to introduce new activities within the market and form businesses 
that, in the long run, create job opportunities and intensify competition (Chaganti 
& Greene, 2002). In the time when all this happens, a significant question that 
concerns income inequality also comes in. The situation appears like the increase 
in the growth of entrepreneurship facilitates the rise in income inequality.  
              One has to note that the act of pursuing and engaging in entrepreneurship 
activities can easily be affected by the nearby demography and the 
socioeconomic circumstances taking into account a variety of factors that are 
capable of promoting the motivations, actions, and intentions of entrepreneurship 
by individuals that are dwelling in a particular country (Ratna, Grafton, & To, 
2017). Socially, the country's structure and social development are crucial factors 
in influencing its entrepreneurial activity. Such a condition is known as 




sociological, and economic climate that characterizes a particular society in 
which entrepreneurs have the liberty to carry out their activity. 
2.2.5.1 Income Inequality in Finland  
In Finland, there has been a 4.5 growth rate of wealth among the top 1 
percent group, but in practice, there are no changes in the bottom of the same 
country, Blinder, at 90 percent between 1987 and 2016. (2012). Statistics show 
that, after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, inequality within wealth 
had continuing growth in the country. In recent years, income disparities have 
been seen in order to increase Bauer substantially (2019). The results of "State of 
Unqualities" in 2020 within Finland were presented, and the report was published 
by the KaleviSorsa organization in August 2020. Based on the latest statistics, 
this report offers an overview of racism, socioeconomic inequalities and gender 
discrimination in Finland. It is important to talk about these inequality 
dimensions together since many are interrelated. The information is provided to 
diversify and improve social debate about inequalities. Racism, for example, 
cannot be distinguished from inequality in income, training or wealth. 
 
A senior economics researcher known as Marja Riihela compared 
revenue development between 1966 and 1990 and between 1990 in his Telford 
report (2019). In the period between 1966 and 1990, incomes disparities have 
decreased, according to the report. As the payment increased significantly, the 
revenue was reduced to smaller parts. The level of development was different 
from 1990 to 2017 because the higher income helped increase the income level 
more significantly. From 1966 to 1990, the revenues of those on the lower decile 
increased 4.9%, and the growth in the top-level income increased by 1.9%, 
Kristof, respectively (2014). During the period from 1990 to 2017, there was an 
increase of 0.8% in the bottom part; however, the 3.6% increase in revenue was 





Since the 1990's and beyond, growth has largely been the high decile, 
indicating an unfair earnings distribution as reported by the journalists. In wealth, 
the problem is seen as the same and, following the outbreak of the financial crises 
of 2008, the rate of wealth inequality continued to grow. In this research, it was 
observed that shareholdings of the richest 1% increased from 8% to a 13.5% share 
between 1987 and 2015. In this same time period, the share belonging to the 
lowest 90% fell from the 65% to the lowest 55% Kristof (2014). 
 
The tax system that supported the increase in income and wealth 
inequality in the 1990s is still a similar system in the research carried out. The 
tax system structure in Finland therefore continues to provide strong income and 
wealth growth support. It is recommended that income and wealth disparities be 
reduced, and separate income and capital taxes be stopped. The action will also 
involve making progress in the tax system in line with revenue growth. 
 
2.2.5.2 Discussing Inequality within Finland  
The rate of revenue inequality is low, while social mobility within Finland 
is respected to be high, in comparison with other countries worldwide. However, 
this involves disadvantages and individuals and observes the persistence of 
intergenerational inequalities in families with accrued disadvantages. Blind, 
Blind (2012). The reports show that the inequalities between wealth in Finland 
have grown since the beginning of the 1980s just in different parts of the world. 
An experience of economic inequality in Finland appeared at the start of the 
1990s. From the 1960s to the end of the 80s, Finland's economy encountered a 
rise in benefits that led to a significant decrease in income inequalities, leading 
to significant growth of the Finnish economy. 
 
The recession outbreak in the early 1990's provided an important turning 
point in Finland's economic development. Mass unemployment has been a 
manifestation of a lot of pressure on the social security system in the country, 




recession outbreak and following its end in the mid-nineties of Goodhart (2013). 
During 1993, the separation of the taxation of earned and capital income also 
flattered, and this period was in contradiction with the progressive tax on income 
levied on capital ads. The decrease was also flattered. 
 
The introduction of this reform meant that owners of capital were able to 
benefit from rapid economic growth in the late 1990s. However, there was a 
relative and absolute loss for those who are dependent on social benefits. Finally, 
income inequality grew fast, and at the end of the 1990s the Goodhart rates fell 
dramatically (2013). During this time, it was replaced by the new ideology that 
created competitiveness in the global market to build a better welfare state. 
 
The steep increase in income inequality in the 2000s decreased and 
inequality within income during the 2000s was found to be intermediate.  
However, since the 2008 Goodhart financial crisis, this status has never returned 
to the level that caused the growth of the inequalities in wealth (2013). The main 
reason was because the capital income tax and revenues were separated, thus 
allowing the accumulation of wealth together with different taxation, based on 
the income type, to be accumulated rather than the amount. Finland's taxation 
system is progressive only in terms of income taxation, which only accounts for 
7% of all state tax revenues. Considering other taxes such as social insurance tax 
and consumption tax, it is strangely that Finland's economic tax system, which is 
the richest Kristof, is regressive in 1% of its population (2014). 
 
The Finnish tax system is being constantly debated and is considered 
extraordinarily hard in taxing the rich and in income distribution. The position is 
actively promoted by the influential Finnish Business and Policy Forum and 
Finland's tax policies are called "tax-pleasing" by its leaders The (Statistics 
Finland, 2017). This kind of highly voiced exaggeration has formed a constant, 
controversial debate about wealth inequalities and income. The reason is that any 




strong opposition, abruptly represented by different groups of interest 
representing the rich. There is no difference between Finland and other countries. 
In certain countries, these trends are also evident. 
 
Moreover, income and wealth inequalities correspond to other types of 
inequality, for example education and the health sector. The levels of education 
and income relate to different aspects of health. It is found that the difference in 
the life expectancy among Finland's richest and poorest people is almost ten years 
old (Finland, 2017). This difference is estimated to be 5 years when it comes to 
women. In the middle of the 1990s, life expectancy increased in all groups. The 
disparities, however, have persisted and have grown slightly. Although there is 
political will to reduce socio-economic richness inequalities, these have persisted 
in Finland and have remained stagnant since the 1970s. 
 
The universal measures designed to improve public health have been 
successful. However, those who are richer, and others with high education, have 
greatly benefited. Employees can access their employers' private healthcare, 
while retired employees, unemployed people and children depend on public 
health care. Nevertheless, the main reason behind health inequalities is the 
general social inequities concerning unemployment, living standards, homes and 
poverty, rather than a result of Finland's health care system. However, 
municipalities play a key role in the development of policies on the above-
mentioned issues that consider health and social services. The current national 
health and social reform was intended to transform the social organizations of all 
300 communities, 21 regional governments and the town of Helsinki by the year 
2023, along with the medical services. The main objective of the reform is to 
improve equality within access to services because now, although national laws 
are binding, the level of services in access and quality is different amongst 
municipalities. If the reform is possible and if it has occurred, its fixed objectives 





As far as education is concerned, the general level of education has 
continuously increased over decades, and it is reported during the 1970s que only 
three quarters of Finland's population have primary school level until 2018. The 
overall rise in education involves a higher level of social mobility. In the 1990s, 
universities were created that primarily taught applied science, enabling 
secondary-school students to graduate. The universities of applied sciences have 
helped to narrow the educational gap between parent children and university 
(PwC, 2017). The regional perspective is so interested as FSUs have a network 
throughout Finland, which includes medium-sized cities. The higher learning 
facilities are so vital to cities and neighboring regions as this ensures that young 
people have a particular level of attraction and offers skilled people to the internal 
labor market. However, one must understand that those challenges do not stop in 
higher education only, and the lower levels of primary and secondary education 
are responsible for the municipalities. The dropping out risk in upper secondary 
education generally affects those that started in the vocational education, training, 
and the young people who speak foreign languages. More so, the student's risk 
of not completing their upper secondary education level is observed to 
progressively increase for the young immigrants compared to Finland's general 
population (PwC, 2017). In education, male students want to take part in 
vocational training while young women want to go to high school. Therefore, 
socioeconomic disparities and the disparities arising from different ethnic, 
language and gender must be balanced by municipal education systems. 
 
2.2.6 Relationship Between Ethnic Diversity, Entrepreneurship and 
Inequality 
Inequality in income has political and financial consequences such as 
slower GDP growth, reduced mobility of income, greater domestic indebtedness, 
polarizing policies and increasing poverty rates. A statistical measure of 
distribution intended to represent income or wealth distribution is the Gini 




developed in 1912 and is the most widely used measuring for wealth or income 
inequality, by Italian statistical scientist Corrado Gini. With 0 being the perfect 
equality and one representing perfect inequality, Gini coefficients range from 0 
(0 per cent) to 1 (100 per cent). A higher Gini coefficient is more unequal. The 
Gini coefficient would be zero if every citizen in a nation had the same income. 
The Gini coefficient would be 1 if one resident earned all revenues in a country 
and the rest earned zero. Ethnic diversity may be related to inequality levels 
positively or negatively.  
A positive relationship between income and ethnic diversityty has various 
possible explanations. A theoretical framework that explains how ethnic 
prejudice and discrimination are associated with Becker (1957). Becker (1957) 
argues that non-discriminatory firms that are more open-minded could force 
discriminators to leave business. Closing of businesses may in turn lead to a loss 
of income and unemployment, which in turn increases the prevalence of the 
incidence of poverty among certain categories of ethnics. Ethnic and linguistic 
fragmentation can specifically lead to discrimination in the workforce and 
occupational separation, leading to a direct loss of income (Gradín et al., 2010; 
Sawhill, 1976).  
Ethnic fragmentation is associated to slower economic growth and poorer 
government policy performance. It is expected to contribute to poverty or to 
prevent attempts to tackle poverty, including poor schooling, slower financial 
development, less physical infrastructure investment and greater distortion of 
foreign exchange rates (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Ethnic diversity is likewise 
linked to poorer governance and institutional quality (Alesina & Zhuravskaya, 
2011). The prevalence of poverty is higher for poorer institutions (Chong & 
Calderón, 2000; Perera & Lee, 2013). There is also evidence of ethnic diversity 
having a negative effect on public goods provision (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 1999; 
Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). The mechanism is that the appropriate types of public 




fewer funds for public goods (see Miguel, 2006). Inadequate public goods could 
lead to increased inequality, leading to greater poverty in turn. 
Moreover, an inherent hierarchical system characterizes ethnic diversity, 
which labels certain groups (e.g., ethnic minorities) as less than other groups 
(Awaworyi Churchill et al., 2015). These labels also promote economic and 
social inequality and contribute to increased poverty. 
A broad range of literature suggests that ethnic diversity, especially trust 
and social networking, is negative for social capital (Alesina & Zhuravskaya, 
2011; Dincer, 2011; Leigh, 2006; Sturgis et al., 2011). Social networks play an 
important role in promoting collective action and reducing poverty. One chance 
is that different ethnic groups don't want to cross ethnic lines and that this leads 
to weaker collective action, including collective action to reduce poverty 
(Miguel, 2006). Another possibility is that Community social penalties stimulate 
collective action, but they are less common in ethnically diverse communities 
where social interaction is less common between ethnic groups (Miguel & 
Gugerty, 2005). 
Otherwise, microfinance loans are often administered through group 
lending schemes to reduce costs and mitigate problems of asymmetric 
information and adverse selection (Stiglitz, 1990; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1990). Karlan 
(2005) suggests that cultural similarity attracts the members of the group. Due to 
the socio-economic status of the poor, formal guarantees are often not practical, 
and thus credit allocation is based on confidence (Fafchamps, 1996). In fractional 
communities’ confidence is eroded. As a result, financial exclude occurs with 
lower confidence in fractionalized societies because potential buyers cannot build 
potential borrowing networks. The poor's failure to earn loans contributes to 
increased poverty. 
Likewise, confidence is a major factor in networking and offers diverse 
opportunities for labour markets (Fafchamps, 1998). Existing literature has 




by providing imperfect information (Fafchamps, 1998; Kranton, 1996). This 
information circulates more effectively among social networks when there is 
privileged information about opportunities. Because social networks depend on 
trust and confidence in more fractionalized societies is reduced, the workforce's 
opportunities are likely to decrease, contributing to higher poverty. 
However, the economic results of ethnic diversity should not always be 
poorer. Diversity of ethnic groups can lead to higher standards of innovation. For 
example, Fafchamps (2000) argues that ethnic diversity could increase local 
entrepreneurs' talent pool and thus improve their quality. If this happens, ethnic 
diversity could increase individual income and thus the effects of ethnic 
heterogeneity on poverty could be expected. Ethnic diversity, however, is linked 
to higher income and societal inequality (Dincer & Lambert, 2012; Milanovic, 
2003), which is argued to exacerbate poverty (see, e.g., Janvry & Sadoulet, 2000; 
Ravallion, 2001). 
Entrepreneurial theories connecting ethnicity with enterprise also concern 
the link between ethnic diversity and poverty. The theory of ethnic enclaves 
suggests that co-ethnic groups are often concentrated in geographical areas and 
related to specific economic activities for which they are known (Wilson & 
Portes, 1980). Consequently, various ethnic groups dominate certain companies 
and businesses. The Ewes and Fantes in Africa, for example, are the fishing 
partners in Ghana's Volta and Central Regions, in Kenya, who dominate the 
industry and in Kenya, as well as the Kenyan Asian fishermen who dominate 
textile industries. Each ethnic group has different cultural values which may 
influence productivity and others in different locations; (Hofstede, 1984; Sowell, 
1981). In particular, the ethnic groups, as well as social institutions, have 
different cultural values and can promote entrepreneurship and innovation on 
several levels (Ibrahim & Galt, 2011; Wilson & Portes, 1980). 
Therefore, inequality can affect result in the link between 




particular occupations, and failure to work with people from other ethnic groups, 
ethnic diversity can exacerbate poverty, especially in cases where economic 
activity is not productive. On the other hand, it may increase productivity if 
individuals of different ethnic groups agree to work together, as entrepreneurial 
skills from different ethnic groups are harnessed. Potential cooperation 
innovation and productivity resulting in poverty reduction and increased income 
can generate higher productivity. 
 
2.3 Literature Review 
Earnings inequality reflects the unequal distribution of national income 
among citizens. In the face of too much inequality, socioeconomic conditions 
such as infant death, crime and opportunities for social mobility are deteriorated 
(Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Stiglitz 2012). Moreover, too little inequality 
exacerbates the problems of free riders and workers, both of which can have 
adverse socio-economic effects (Cornia, Addison, and Kiiski 2004). In the case 
of countries which are still industrialized due to the prevalence of unproductive 
labor, income inequality is usually low according to Milanovic, (2011). Then 
inequality rises as production work comes, and afterwards drops again as 
countries become richer and part of the wealth is redistributed by means of taxes 
and social transfers, during the beginning of the industrialisation (Milanovic 
2011).  
 
The curve of the Kuznets (Kuznets 1955, 1963) usually suggests that 
inequality in revenues is good for growth (Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa 
1999). The first to suggest a non-linear relationship between income inequality 
and revenue per capita was Kuznets (1955). He suggested that income inequality 
coincides with economic and industrial development along an inverted U-shaped 
Road. His hypothesis therefore says that income inequality increases with 




economic development after reaching its peak. Note that there is no common 
agreement between economic growth and income inequalities regarding potential 
causality (direct or reverse) (Kuznets 1955; Okun 1975; Mankiw 2013). 
 
 Another strand of literature is that the lack of inequalities induces lack of 
economic stimulus (Mirrlees 1971; Okun 1975). On the other hand, too much 
inequality (crime, tension, social unrest), which exacerbated poverty and stalled 
growth, had a detrimental effect on economy and society (Persson and Tabellini 
1994; Deininger and Squire 1998; Aghion and Garcia-Penalosa 1999). Persson 
and Tabellini (1994) argue, for example, that inequality in income harms growth 
because it means greater redistribution and fewer production and economic 
growth incentives. Although there are different circumstances and incentives, 
people may wish to achieve higher standards of living.  
 
Carsrud and Brannback (2011) argued that, beside individual motivations 
and cognitive factors, achieving higher standard of living is often constrained by 
contextual conditions. A growing body of research has considered the prevalence 
of income inequality to be a contextual barrier. As it contributes to a relatively 
low level of trust, ability, social mobility, physical health (Benabou 1996; Mo 
2000; Stiglitz 2012; Corak 2013; Seery and Arendar 2014; Van Zanden, Baten, 
and Ercole 2014) it is regarded as disincentive for human development and other 
social challenges (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Countries with relatively high-
income injustices, insider privileges and unequal opportunities are also more 
frequent (Birdsall 2006; Stiglitz 2012; Corak 2013; Seery and Arendar 2014). 
 
 Nel (2006) has shown that the less fortunate at the extreme level 
'persistently deny opportunities for economic improvement throughout 
generations.' These arguments also coincide with Smiths view of the eighteenth 
century (1790): differences in socioeconomic rank not because of differences 
between individual competences and abilities but because of "bornins and 




towards social and economic growth (Quadrini 1999; Bruton, Ketchen, and 
Ireland 2013; MANKIW 2013; Tobias, Mair and Barbosa-Leiker 2013). In a 
relatively high level of income inequality, rich individuals have strong incentives 
to maintain inequalities. They promote mechanisms to reduce access to education 
and redevelopment (Acemoglu and Johnson in 2005) or promote regressive 
taxation and rent. 
 
Ragoubi and S. El harbi in 2014 (Bourguignon and Verdier in 2000; 
Corak in 2013; Seery and Arendar; Van Zanden in 2014, Baten and Ercole) 
(Stiglitz 2012; Seery and Arendar 2014). Otherwise, the advantages of social 
mobility can be found by poorer people because of significant obstacles to 
achieving their will (Fujiwara-Greve and Greve 2000; Corak 2013). Several 
people are dismayed and wonder if a lack of 'equality of opportunity' (Corak 
2013), genetic heritage (Sacerdote in 2007; Benjamin, Cesarini, and Chabris in 
2012), or 'born and fortune' have dictated their fate (Smith 1790).  
 
However, Mankiw (2013) argued that, together to successful experiences 
from others, the growing spread of knowledge throughout the world leads to 'anti-
mal spirits,' not as a result of weighted average quantitative benefit multiplied by 
the quantitative probabilities' Their results are spontaneous urgency for action 
(Keynes 1936). To become a contractor can be a way to pursue these animal 
spirits (XavierOliveira, Laplume, and Pathak 2015). The relatively high level of 
income inequality could cause a social turmoil (Xavier-Oliveira, Laplume, and 
Pathak 2015). This turmoil can lead people to do everything they can to move up 
the socioeconomic ladder, especially from the poorer households (Quadrini 1999; 
Sachs 2003, 2005; Bruton, Ketchen, and Ireland 2013; Pathak, Laplume, and 
Xavier-Oliveira 2013, 2014; Laplume, Pathak, and Xavier-Oliveira 2014). 
 
Although Locke (2000) and Shane, Locke, and Collins (2003), 
acknowledged the relevance of contextual factors, argued that the combination 




He claimed that individuals tend to become entrepreneurs due to the need for 
self-employment, or to identify an attractive business opportunity, and to act on 
it. Reynolds, Hay, and Bygraved (2002) and Lippmann, Davis, and Aldrich 
(2005) argued Carsrud and Brannback (11), who suggested that those who 
needed businessmen should be driven by survival needs and those who wanted 
to survive, should be distinguished from opportunist entrepreneurs. Need 
businessmen are driven mainly by tangible external motives such as food and 
shelter revenues and entrepreneurs tend to get motivated by inherent motivation, 
such as a personal interest in entrepreneurship, a need to achieve or stimulate 
their activities (Carsrud and Brannback 2011). Lippmann,  
 
Davis and Aldrich (2005) report that, while having a greater impact on 
need rather than opportunities, every form of entrepreneurship is likely to be 
spurred to greater income inequalities. These authors focused on how inequalities 
in distribution of resources affect entrepreneurship. Interestingly, countries with 
higher incomes inequalities have higher business activity levels. In addition, they 
submitted that high inequalities could demonstrate that countries with surpassing 
capital investments in new enterprises in the top end of the revenue distribution. 
In contrast, they claimed that self-employment could be the only viable job form 
for many in countries in which large segments of the population have few 
financial resources. Based on a multi-level analysis of income inequality, Xavier-
Oliveira, Laplume and Pathak (2015) provided a new insight into the different 
roles of human and financial capital in different kinds of entrepreneurship. The 
analysis provided a new insight. They showed that as inequality increased, both 
forms of capital became weaker impediments to the enterprise of necessity, while 
only financial capital became a stronger predictor for the enterprise of 
opportunity.  
 
              Such studies are primarily used in a national survey for socioeconomic 
on the expenditure of households to measure inequality within the per-capita 




includes the household expenditure predicts better the welfare status than income 
since the cost of household does not fluctuate much during the short-run period 
than income for families. The second factor is that the consumption expenditure 
of households in countries like Indonesia that are still developing can rely upon 
more than income. 
              Some research was carried out to discover the existing correlation 
between ethnic diversity alongside inequality. The results obtained show that 
demographic factors influenced ethnic minorities to have living standards that 
are lower than the ethnic minorities living within the nation of Vietnam. Whereas, 
Gradin (2015), in his research about the government of China, found out that 
ethnic minorities possess a higher poverty incidence than the other groups since 
they prefer living in mountainous areas and places with lower rates of 
development. Therefore, these receive no benefits associated with economic 
growth. In the nation of Vietnam, the ethnic minorities are encompassed with 
high poverty rates because their household attributes are unfavorable, so their 
education, dwelling places, etc. All these happen because returns obtained by 
ethnic minorities are lower when compared with other groups.  
              The survey was conducted by Alesina and La Ferara (2015) to find out 
the correlation between the concepts of ethnic diversity alongside economic 
performance. During this study, the researchers assessed the effects of ethnic 
diversity on financial performance based on policy alternatives. The researchers 
said that ethnicity highly affects the willingness to interact because of limited 
information alongside different productivities. These also argued further that 
heterogeneity result in a reduction in public goods' provision since groups that 
compete have no thought of collaborating. Empirical evidence reveals that the 
existence of these effects is intentional. Heterogeneity is, however, thought to 
possess the impact that is different within countries with the democratic nature 




Dincer and Hotard (2011) assessed using data collected for 10years in 58 
countries concerning the relationship between ethnicity and religious diversity 
alongside income inequality. The researchers mentioned they agreed about a 
strong relationship between ethnic diversity and religion and the resultant social 
misunderstanding which causes inequality in income. These further discovered 
that religious diversity and ethnicity are observed to possess a U-shaped inverted 
relationship with inequality in pay. The explanation is that religious diversity and 
ethnicity explain the percentage of 80% variation of the Gini coefficient in 
controlling the included variables.  
Chadha and Nandwani (2018) assessed the correlation between inequality 
and ethnic fragmentation by providing public goods within India by using data 
from the national survey sample, which they collected on the expenditure on 
income. By considering different factors, for example, ethnic groups, the 
researchers discovered that horizontal inequality within ethnic groups poorly 
influenced the general expenditure inequality. In contrast, inequality was 
mentioned to be higher across the fragmented districts.    
Arifin et al. (2015) carried out research that was the first to measure ethnic 
diversity and province and the district level within Indonesia while using data 
collected during the population census of 2010. The researchers discovered that 
the country is ethnically fractionalized relatively as the index of ethnic 
fractionalization is 0.81, and the index for ethnic polarization was also measured 
and was 0.5.2. Muller (2016) basing on a life survey for families in Indonesia, 
discovered that ethnic diversity levels are smaller than the economic inequality, 
which remains the same whether they use fractionalization, horizontal inequality, 
or polarization.  
Muttaqien et al. (2018) used the IFLS of 2014 to 2015 and analyzed the 
effect imposed by ethnicity on income polarization within Indonesia. They found 
out that their race affects income polarization in the case of independent variables 




reduced by including more covariates and turn out to be less significant when 
regional characteristics are controlled.   
Most studies conducted on ethnic diversity alongside economic inequality 
involve the use of cross-country data. However, these studies have weaknesses 
because each country possesses its ethnic characteristics and financial condition. 
The literature has revealed studies that examine fully the effects imposed by 
ethnic diversity on expenditure inequality in Indonesia. The country has much 
data concerning economic and demographic and uses the same ethnic 
classification across the regions.   
Empirical studies that were carried out on this problem by various 
researchers discovered no positive correlation between the civil war incidence 
and ethnic fractionalization (Vermeulen, Tillie, & Van de Walle, 2012). Instead, 
these authors found that ethnic fractionalization, which is high, creates safety in 
the society as coordination costs are more heightened. No ethnic group is large 
and strong enough to exercise dominance over others. Another study despised 
ethnic fractionalization and mentioned polarization among the significant factors 
that influence the civil war incidences. Unfortunately, the ethnic fractionalization 
measure cannot capture the ethnic polarization among different countries. The 
authors basing on their research mentioned that in highly fractionalized and 
homogeneous societies, the violence is less, and civil war incidences are high 
across cultures where the non-negligible group is dominated by the ethnic group 
that is ruling (Smallbone et al., 2010). 
Such cases need to be measured by polarization instead of 
fractionalization to capture the ethnic conflict's latent danger. In the year 1997, 
Easterly and Levine applied the ethnic fractionalization measure to study this 
same issue, despite mentioning the potential effects associated with ethnic 
polarization unto policies that affect growth (Sluiter, Tolsma, &Scheepers, 2015). 
Although ethnicity is known to directly impact economic growth, Easterly and 




the quantitative relevance of transmission channels in which change is affected 
indirectly by ethnicity was carried out by Garcia-Montalvo&Reynal-Querol in 
the year 2005 (Chaston, 2012). The researchers specified and also estimated the 
comprehensive equations' system that aimed to determine the growth alongside 
the transmission channels by which ethnic polarization and fractionalization can 
affect change (Vermeulen, Tillie, & Van de Walle, 2012). The researchers made 
an argument and said that change is negatively affected by ethnic polarization. It 
causes a decrease in the investment rate and increases public consumption and 
civil war incidence. 
In contrast, the findings of these researchers suggested that growth is not 
indirectly affected by ethnic fractionalization via such channels. Still, instead, it 
does this directly, for example, through reducing the exchange of ideas within 
the economy. These researchers found out that these researchers contrast with the 
Easterly and Levine estimates that were carried out in the year 1997 as these 
provided a negative relationship between political stability and fiscal stance on 














In this part, the research reveals the methodology that is to be used to 
explore the topic and its objectives. The section involves various factors, 
including the research method, research sample, general information needed, data 
collection methods, methods and procedures for estimating the analysis. 
3.1 Research Method 
A panel data is used for the research. The panel data includes observations of 
multiple events over multiple periods obtained for various entities. We can 
examine the data over time across countries using panel data. There are many 
advantages to panel data. One can control individual heterogeneity by using panel 
data, for example. Transversal and time series studies do not control 
heterogeneity, which may prejudicially affect results. In our case it could also be 
other variables that are country-invariant or time-invariant in a country to analyse 
the effects of income inequity on ethnic diversity and entrepreneurship. 
Panel data can manage invariant variables for this country or time. By combining 
time series and cross-section observations, the panel data displays more detailed 
data. Our study will benefit from the fact that the selected countries will have 
information over time on economic growth, income inequality, and other 
economic growth determinants. In addition, panel data have the advantage of 
giving a better picture of dynamic adjustment as distinct from cross-section and 
time series. In other words, panel data are better for identifying and assessing 
effects that cannot be detected in pure cross-sectional data or in pure time series. 
Finally, data models can be designed and tested for more complex behavioural 
models than just cross-section or time-series information (Baltagi, 2008.) 
Data from the panel also have some design and data collection constraints that 
could be problems. Selectivity issues and measurement error distortions may also 




dimensions. The empirical study is based on panel data from 2001 to 2016. The 
used dataset is highly balanced. In other words, for all the variables used in the 
study every country contains data for all years. The database and other sources 
are collected from Finnish statistics. Some years, however, do not contain enough 
data, otherwise their cause from the sample size will be excluded. Therefore, we 
dropped these years to get robust results, and we ended up with the 17 Years 
(2001-2016) of Data for both the United States and Finland. 
3.2 Research Design 
The research uses panel data for the time period 2001-2016 to investigate the 
relationship between Ethnic diversity, Entrepreneurship income inequality  
alongside some control variables at the macro and microeconomic level. At the 
beginning we start with the simple main model: 
 
TEA𝑖t = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖t + 𝛽2TEA𝑖t + 𝜸𝒁𝐢t +µ 𝑖+𝜖𝑖t 
 
Where, the subscript I (=1…, n) represents country and t (= 1,…,T) the period 
(years). X symbolizes the Gini coefficient, Z𝑖t denotes set of control variables in 
their stationary form such as the first difference of real GDP, human capital, 
Education Quality, inflation rate, fertility rate, market distortions; µ 𝑖 represents 
the unobserved country-specific fixed-effects such as country’s location, 
demography, culture that needs to be controlled before we explore the impact of 
explanatory variables on Total Entrepreneurial Activities to avoid 
misspecification of the model; and ɛi stands for the error term.  
3.2.1 Source of Data Collection 
The sample dimensions include the USA, Finland and based lined with the 
twenty-one other developed countries choosing randomly among OECD states 
and covered a period of 2001 to 2016. The data sets were obtained from the World 
Bank's annual Doing Business Report and the World Enterprise Monitor (GEM) 




(tietokannat.fi) Database, World Income Inequality Database – WIID, OECD’s 
i-Liberarys and the World Bank.   
The objective is to locate, evaluate and interpret evidence from the past from 
which the present can be explained and the future visualized. A full balanced 
panel dataset from 2001 to 2016 has been obtained. Sample data on on ethnic 
diversity for the period was extracted from the Historical Index of Ethnic 
Fractionalization (HIEF), which provides an estimated annual ethnic 
fractionalisation from 1945 to 2013.  
The statistical limitation of the sample is considerable and is a natural effect of 
the use of GEM data. Given that GEM countries are expensive, developed 
countries will be able to afford the cost of conducting these surveys more likely 
(Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2012). 
3.2.2 Hypothesis Testing 
Based on the conceptual framework that entrepreneurship leads to greater income 
inequality, and in brief, on the RGR theory, the decalcification model and mainly 
on the above-mentioned argument, three hypotheses are dealt with:  
H1: There exist a positive relationship between ethnic diversity, income held by 
top 10% and Entrepreneurial Activities in both countries. 
H2: Income held by the top 1% of population in the country has a positive effect 
on entrepreneurial activities in both countries. 
H3: Ethnic diversity has a positive effect on Entrepreneurial Activities in both 
countries. 
These hypothesis ere adopted from the assumptions that extend the findings of 
Lecunás (2014), which suggest that the extent of entrepreneurship is moderately 
unequal. However, the three hypotheses, which differs from Lecuna (2014), 
explain income inequalities by using three distinct measures enabling business 
activities (Macroeconomics, Institutional and Social)., instead of separate 




database, including a Quality Measure of Business (high-aspiration 
entrepreneurs). The three measures of entrepreneurship are employed because the 
results observed may vary between various types of enterprise activities, 
according to the literature. 
Furthermore, hypotheses serve as a counterpoint to Choi's 'optimistic' criticism, 
in 1999, of Kuznets’s (1955) inverted U-shape Theory that 'income inequality 
rises until a critical level of income is reached, following which inequality starts 
diminished' (Dobson & Ramlogan, 2009, p. 226). This study also reviews old 
views about entrepreneurs. The 'merchants' were entrepreneurs who made the 
archaic trade possible according to the Kontošić Pamić and to Belullo (2018, page 
1592). In Babylon, for example, entrepreneurs have managed the palace and its 
armed forces, and entrepreneurs controlled the manufacture, trade and credit of 
handicraft in ancient Greece and Rome entrepreneur’s have historically been 
deemed weak and corrupt, that results in wealth acquisition intended to 
constantly keep up propagates them to the top percent income holders. 
3.3 Methods and Specification 
This study observes the effect of ethnic diversity and inequality at the upper-
bound on entrepreneurial activities using a multiple regression analysis over a 
period of 18years. The regression model that we estimate is provided by:  
TEA𝑖t = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖t + 𝛽2Y𝑖t + 𝛽2𝛾𝑖t + 𝜸𝒁𝐢t+ µ 𝑖 +𝜖𝑖t ............................................(1) 
where i and t refers to country and time variant respectively, 𝛾𝑖t is the independent 
variable proxy by Income inequality at the upper-bound, 𝛼 is the constant term, 𝑋𝑖t is a variable of ethnic diversity measured by index of fractionalization, and 
Y𝑖t is the global inequality index (GINI).   
The dependent variable TEA𝑖t represent annual entrepreneurship activities proxy 






3.3.1 Definition of Variables 
3.3.1.1 Dependent Variable  
The TEA shows the percentage of adults engaged in entrepreneurship who are 
either entrepreneurs or new business owners. The TEA calculates the proportion 
of entrepreneurship driven by both opportunities and necessities. Although 
certain scholars sought to distinguish these measures by examining 
entrepreneurship rates, other scholars argued that the distinction is mainly 
irrelevant, as 'people can build high-growth, job-creating, wealth generating 
firms even if their motivation to start a company is a necessity'; Shane, (2009). 
The TEA offers benefits since the TEA focuses on personal and formal as well 
as informal work. GEM studies examine grassroots behaviours, like the 
Entrepreneurship Eurobarometer, which was developed by the Gallup 
organisation; but GEM studies cover more countries over a more extended 
period. This approach provides the entrepreneurial activity with a more detailed 
picture of the activities of other firms, including the ability to explain the different 
behaviour patterns that exist between formal and informal entrepreneurs and, 
hence, accounts for the non-significant pairwise correlations with high-growth 
tax-declaring start-ups (the correlation coefficients are overall relatively weak, 
which is a good indication that the three independent variables do not present 
multicollinearity issues).  
3.3.1.2 Independent Variable 
As the dependent variable, Inequality proxy by the Gini coefficient (Gini) Ethnic 
Fractionalization Index HEFI, Income held by top 10% of the country and other 
control variables as described thus: 
3.3.1.2.1 Income Inequality 
In many studies and contexts, the Gini index has been used and validated. The 
Gini index is used to study gross insurance premiums in Croatia, for example by 




is presented as the Gini coefficient, which measures the degree of inequality in 
the distribution of the income within a country. A Gini coefficient that is equal 
to zero expresses perfect equality and a Gini coefficient that is equal to 100 
expresses maximal inequality. The Gini coefficient data represents a compilation 
and adaptation of Gini coefficients retrieved from nine different sources in order 
to create a single “standardized” Gini variable (WB). Gini coefficient is widely 
used in the literature (Barro, 2000 and others) 
3.3.1.2.2 Ethnic Diversity Index 
As a variable for ethnic diversity, this study uses ethnic fractionalization index 
(efi) or ethnic polarization. Values of these indices are obtained from Arifin et al. 
(2015). The choice of chosen the HIEF dataset is because its largely based on an 
ethnic, rather than linguistic, distinction between groups. In the HIEF dataset, the 
degree of ethnic fractionalization has been calculated based on the annual 
percentage of ethnic groups in each country using the most universally applied 
formula in the empirical literature which is a decreasing transformation of the 
Herfindahl concentration index measured by: 
EFct=1−∑ni=1S2i 
where EFct is the level of ethnic fractionalization in country c at time t, i indexes 
ethnic groups, and Si is the proportion of the population in unit c belonging to 
ethnic group i (i = 1, …, n) at time t. 
As described above, the ethnic fractionalization index for a country at any given 
year ranges from 0, where there is no ethnic fractionalization in the country and 
all individuals are members of the same ethnic group, to 1, where everyone in the 
country belongs to his or her own ethnic group. 






3.3.1.2.3 Control Variables 
           In terms of the macroeconomic environment, our specifications used the 
following five variables: income, unemployment, poverty, inflation and 
investment. The GDP logarithm is used to measure revenues. PIB (current prices 
in U.S. dollars). The market exchange rate in national currency is used to convert 
the GDP values into USD (yearly average). Unemployment refers to the overall 
percentage of unemployed people. The unemployment rate can be defined by 
national definitions, harmonized ILOs or harmonized OECD definitions. Poverty 
is a percentage of households who eat or earn less than the level of poverty per 
person. The default poverty rate is $1.9 per day in 2011. 
Investments are expressed as a ratio of total investments in local currencies and 
GDP in current local currencies. The total value and change in the inventory and 
acquisition of a gross fixed capital formation and of the less valuable disposal of 
one unit or industry measure investment. Investment 
According to Berg and Sachs (1988) and Sachs, those countries with extreme 
income inequality, ceteris paribus, may be subject to "bad" macroeconomic 
policies (1989). Of the five macroeconomic controls tested, poverty is likely the 
most important. Poverty. The strong and intimate relationship between poverty 
and inequality between Mookherjee and Ray (2010). Faches' pay against poverty 
is high in comparison to unqualified salaries. Therefore, in a society which is 
poor enough (but equal) in a single generation, a high degree of inequality could 
suffer, which would then be strengthened by Mookherjee & Rad (2010). Another 
scholar's previous poverty analysis can be extended to cover Mookherjee & Ray's 
initial inequality (2010), with the Gini variable being twice overdue for one and 
two periods. 
Following Lecuna and Chávez, in 2018, World Bank global governance, in 
addition to macroeconomic controls and initial inequalities In addition to 
macroeconomic controls and initial inequality, following Lecuna and Chavez 




Global Bank Indicators of Governance (WGI). These indicators include 
corruption, the rule of law, political stability and nonviolence and property rights. 
Controlling corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is used for private profit, including both small and large-scale corruption. The 
rule of law reflects the extent to which officers have confidence and comply with 
societal rules and the chance of crime or violence, especially the quality of 
enforcement of contracts, rights to property, police and courts. 
The extent of national participation, freedom of speech, freedom of association 
and free media, reflects voice and accountability. Political stability reflects the 
likelihood that the government may be destabilized or overthrown by controlling 
or violence, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. Property 
rights shall be treated as follows: to what extent are property rights, including 
financial assets, protected? 
Naudé (2010) states that the two disciplines, i.e; economic development and 
business entrepreneurship, converged on the knowledge that the institutional 
framework is important in order to understand the outcomes observed for each 
area, although few studies specifically examine relation between the regions 
(Soriano and Dobon, 2009, p. 236). The average probability that weak institutions 
will exist in highly unequal countries (Alesina and Tabellini, 1988; Sachs, 1989). 
Naudé (2010) adds that in turn institutional failures result in income inequalities 
in the revenue and rent economy (see Table 2 for a description of the control 
variables). 
The Global Competitiveness Report, which describes "basic and business 
factors," also included the following five controls: education quality, life 
expectancy, easy access to loans, the flexibility of wage determination as well as 
the overall fiscal rate. The representative of education asks: how does the 
educational system meet the needs of your country's competitive economy? The 
healthcare provider refers to life expectancy (in years). The personal finance 




sound business plan and collateral. The variables of unemployment address 
unemployment and entrepreneurship. As unemployment can take any form from 
that standout, the study has determined the total unemployment in accordance 
with the world back index as a percentage of the working age in each country. 
The overall proxy for fiscal rates is particularly important because the economic 
elites increase their ability to resist fiscal policies Goods (1989). The sum of five 
distinct types of taxes and taxes to be paid following deduction accounts and 
exemption: profit or corporate income tax, social taxes and labor income taxes 
paid by the employer. The following are two types of taxes. 
Apriorially, the following three institutional indicators are identified as potential 
multi-linearity sources: the rule of law, control of corruption and the simple 
interconnection of voice and accountability that is often unreliable and 
misleading. 
3.4 Model Estimation Technique. 
           The research model was estimated using a panel data technique on E-
views statistical package. Panel data was admitted due group wise and regional 
analysis required rather than individual bases. Subsequently, we tested for serial 
correlation problem in the data set before proceeding to further estimating 
techniques.  
Different methods, such as Pooled ordinary least square (POLS) or Panel Least 
Square, Fixed effect Model and Random Effect Model was used to run regression 
the analysis. However, a country-specific effect that affects Inequality are 
difficult to be explored. If the unobserved country specific variables are 
correlated with the regressors, our models will produce biased results which 
contradicts the OLS assumptions.  
To solve this problem, the researcher has adopted a Least Square Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) to capture any differences on the intercepts using the fixed 




TEA𝑖t = 𝛽1Gini𝑖t + 𝛽2ΔEthnic_Dvc𝑖t + 𝛽3Δ ZINCOME_10_ 𝑖t +𝜸𝒁𝐢t+ 𝜸DA𝐢t +δDF𝐢t +𝜖𝑖t 
..............................................................(2)  
Where DA represents (DA1 to DA17), and DF represent (DF1 to DF17) for the 
dummy variables for the United States and Finland respectively. The intercept is 
captured by the factor 𝜸 and δ respectively, all measured. 
Similarly, we implore the random effects technique with a slight modification to 
the error term in our original model and test for redundancy afterwards. We 
obtain:  
TEA𝑖t =𝛼 +𝛽1Gini𝑖t + 𝛽2ΔEthnic_Dvc𝑖t + 𝛽3Δ ZINCOME_10_𝑖t +𝜸𝒁𝐢t + (δ𝐢t +µ 𝑖t) 
..........................................................................(3)  
Where µ 𝑖t captured the OLS part of no trend in the equation, δ𝐢t Is the difference 
for all cross sections to get individual intercept with 𝛼. 
Giving an unrealistic appearance, especially if α varies over time, it is better to 
test all the previously mentioned variables in order to see which are the most 
suited model since random effects necessitate the unconnected nature of omitted 
variables with the regressors, which focus on the Randomness of the sample 
sizes. In order to choose the right model, we use economic rationality and 
statistical insights using the Hausman test. 
Our study then found a problem in the dataset with a serial correlation. We 
therefore estimate our models using the first differences. By doing that, we do 
not only address the serial correlation problem but also produce consistent 
results. In summary, the study estimates its finding using the following three 
equations:  
• Model 1: Pooled Panel Model 




• Model 2: Fixed Effect Model 
ΔTEAit = 𝛽1ΔGini𝑖t + 𝛽2ΔEthnic_Dvc𝑖t + 𝛽3Δ ZINCOME_10_ 𝑖t + 𝛽4ΔGDP𝑖t+ 𝛽5ΔUnemloy𝑖t + 𝛽6ΔTAX𝑖t 𝛽7ΔPov𝑖t+ + 𝛽7ΔInv𝑖t + 𝛽8ΔCONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION𝑖t + 𝛽9ΔZGOVT_EFFECTIVNESSt𝑖t + 𝛽10Δ POLIICAL_STABILITY_AND_NO_VIOLENCE𝑖t + 𝛽11Δ REGULATION_QUALITY _𝑖t + 𝛽13Δlife_Exp𝑖t +  𝛽13ΔQ_Edu𝑖t + 𝛽14Δvoice_Acct𝑖t + 𝛽15Δrule_Law𝑖t + 𝛽16Δease_Loan𝑖t + ɛ𝑖t +C(18) + [CX=F]........................Model (2) 
• Model 3: Random-Effect Model 


















Data Presentation, Analysis and Results 
4.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, we perform all necessary statistical and econometric analysis in 
line with economic theories, using E-Views 11statistical package.  
4.1 Presentation of Result 
Figures 1 to 18 in appendix 2provide suggestive evidence of the relationship 
between ethnic diversity, our measures of entrepreneurship activities and income 
inequality at top 10%. While the scatter plots suggest a positive association 
between ethnic diversity, and entrepreneurship activities. Figures 19 to 23 show 
the relationship between the global inequality index, and entrepreneurship 
activities both countries.  
4.1.1 Relationship Between Key Variables 
First, we examine the data variables in other to show the relationship between 
our variables of interest, which are ethnic diversity, Entrepreneurial activities and 
Top 1 percent inequality. We unobserved from figure 1 below, that as growth in 
ethnic diversity increases, entrepreneurship activities also increase in the United 
State while it is almost constant in Finland. We can juxtapose that the growth in 
entrepreneurial activities has been kept constant for two periods at (.133 and 
.137) compared to the United States as shown in figure 2, where ethnic diversity 
has constantly been on in the increased from its period of declination. Thus, 






Figure 1Interaction between Ethnic Diversity and TEA in Finland 
 
 



















































4.1.2 Cross-interaction of Variables. 
Appendix 4-6 shows the table of correlation among the three classified 
independent variables (macroeconomics, institutional and social) and the 
correlation between the dependent variables and the independent variables. 
The table shows that from the graph, we observe that there is a linear but negative 
relationship in the diversity of ethnic groups in both countries, however, this 
diversity has showed no correlation between the growth of entrepreneurial 
activities, income inequality at the 10% as well as the world global inequality 
index. Hence, it is noteworthy to analyse the reasons for such disparity. 
4.1.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
The descriptive statistic was conducted on the raw series of the data and not its 
transformed form. Due to the large number of observation (315 observations) of 
the study, we have presented the result in appendix 1. The summary distribution 
shows that our data is highly biased and highly skewed with large kurtosis. This 
shows that mean value is highly influenced by sample outlier’s, hence our dataset 
is nor symmetrical. Similarly, the standard deviation is also high, indicating a 
large deviation of individual sample set from the mean. Hence, from a statistical 
perspective we conclude that our data is not stationary and proceed to run a 
further diagnosis test of stationarity on our dataset. 
4.2 Panel Unit Root Test 
All the samples in data presented a unit root at level according to the Levin, Lin 
and Chul, Augumented Dikki and fuller Fisher Chi Square but becomes 
stationary at first difference. While we have shown in Figure 1 below, the graph 













4.2.1 Models Estimations 
Table 1, 3 and 4 reports the estimation results when adopting a panel data model 
and test results to determine whether thee which panel model is more appropriate. 
Regressions (1) (2) and (3) are those for the pooled OLS (no fixed nor time-
period effects), one-way (individual) fixed-effects models and the random-fixed 
effect model, respectively. We perform a LR test to choose between the fixed 
effect and the pooled OLS models. The results reported in Table 2 suggest that 
the one-way (individual) fixed or random effect specification is the preferred 
panel data model. For both specifications, all the panel data models may suffer 
from misspecification if dependence exists within the data. Thus, to test for the 
presence of such dependence, we begin by conducting the classical Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) tests (Burridge 1980; Anselin, Le Gallo, and Jayet 2008). 
When using the classical LM tests both the hypothesis of no lagged dependent 
variable and the hypothesis of no autocorrelated error term must be rejected at 











































































































































When examining these tests’ robust counterparts (Debarsy and Ertur 2010), the 
hypothesis of no autocorrelated error term must still be rejected at one percent 
significance level. However, the hypothesis of no lagged dependent variable can 
be rejected at five percent as well as one percent significance, provided that fixed 
effects are included. These results imply that a model specification with an 
autocorrelated error terms variable may be favored over a pooled panel model 
since we find consistent rejection of the hypothesis of no autocorrelated error. 
To further test which panel model specification is appropriate, we conduct a 
Hausman specification test in order to test the assumption of whether fixed 
effects provide a better fit to the data than random effects. The results of the 
Hausman test are listed in Tables 5 This test suggests that the random effects are 
accepted at five percent as well as one percent significance levels.  
4.2.1.1 Model 1: POOL OLS Result 
First, we examine the regression using a pooled OLS on the assumption of equal 
intercept and the result shows a highly statistically significant P-Value for most 
of the variables. While the result shows a negative but statistically significant 
relationship between global inequality index and entrepreneurship growth, there 
exist a positive relationship between income held by the top 10 percent and 
entrepreneurship growth. Our variable ethnic diversity is not statistically 
significant at this point, though it exhibits a negative relationship with the 
dependent variable showing that ethnic diversity increases competition, from 
developmental economics theory perspective. 
Although, the R Squared and adjusted R Squared values are high, the pooled ols 
does not distinguish between the countries individual heterogeneity and neglects 
the cross-section and time series of the data. As such, we proceed to examine the 







Results estimate with coefficients. 
ZTEA = -2.08391753577*ZGINI - 0.0533384311961*ZE_DIVERSITYINDEX + 
0.59229894348*ZINCOME_10_ + 5.51193123252e-13*ZGDP - 0.274525652147*ZUNEMPLOYMENT 
+ 0.0299042355192*ZTAX + 77.7040793746*ZPOVERTY + 0.633096671047*ZINVESTMENT + 
4.28249216843*ZCONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION - 0.446480096741*ZGOVT_EFFECTIVNESS + 
0.351081550514*ZPOLIICAL_STABILITY_AND_NO_VIOLENCE - 
2.21371007401*ZREGULATION_QUALITY + 0.0123873780475*ZLIFE_EXPECTANCY + 
0.166091660512*ZQ_EDUCATION + 4.72565790064*ZVOA + 1.54535276256*ZRULE_OF_LAW - 
6.07056160624*ZEASE_LOAN - 0.00823370566045 
 
4.2.2 Redundant Test for Fixed/Random Effect Choice 
Following the output of result, the researcher has chosen to follow the guidelines 
and should use a one period fixed or random effect as the p-value for the cross-
section is Signiant as well as both. However, the period effect is insignificant, 
Dependent Variable: ZTEA
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 06/06/21   Time: 06:52
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2016
Periods included: 15
Cross-sections included: 21
Total panel (balanced) observations: 315
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
ZGINI -2.08391... 0.1864268... -11.17820... 1.90021...
ZE_DIVERSITYINDEX -0.05333... 0.0669660... -0.796500... 0.42637...
ZINCOME_10_ 0.592298... 0.1790253... 3.3084637... 0.00105...
ZGDP 5.511931... 1.5048924... 3.6626745... 0.00029...
ZUNEMPLOYMENT -0.27452... 0.1107377... -2.479061... 0.01372...
ZTAX 0.029904... 0.0464511... 0.6437777... 0.52021...
ZPOVERTY 77.70407... 12.921579... 6.0135126... 5.32255...
ZINVESTMENT 0.633096... 0.1101163... 5.7493443... 2.22303...
ZCONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION 4.282492... 0.7016257... 6.1036700... 3.23258...
ZGOVT_EFFECTIVNESS -0.44648... 0.9777920... -0.456620... 0.64827...
ZPOLIICAL_STABILITY_AND_NO_VIOLE... 0.351081... 0.3986393... 0.8806997... 0.37919...
ZREGULATION_QUALITY -2.21371... 0.9652544... -2.293395... 0.02252...
ZLIFE_EXPECTANCY 0.012387... 0.2058600... 0.0601737... 0.95205...
ZQ_EDUCATION 0.166091... 0.3895022... 0.4264203... 0.67011...
ZVOA 4.725657... 0.8562635... 5.5189294... 7.43641...
ZRULE_OF_LAW 1.545352... 1.2738308... 1.2131537... 0.22603...
ZEASE_LOAN -6.07056... 1.9337526... -3.139264... 0.00186...
C -0.00823... 0.0151771... -0.542508... 0.58787...
Root MSE 0.250533...     R-squared 0.7326493313141649
Mean dependent var -0.00203...     Adjusted R-squared0.7173464310863561
S.D. dependent var 0.485305...     S.E. of regression0.2580134615411094
Akaike info criterion 0.183835...     Sum squared resid19.77157106191839
Schwarz criterion 0.398267...     Log likelihood -10.95405075055226
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.269509...     F-statistic 47.87650186614821




hence the estimation will not take into consideration, the randomization of the 
period effects in estimating.  
Table 2: Redundancy Test 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Model 2: One Way Fixed Effect Model Result 
Considering the individual countries heterogeneity across the series to have its 
own intercept with constant time variant, the result obtained is similar to the 
POOLED OLS, except for the increased R Squared which accounts for the 
inclusion of variables that could have otherwise been excluded from our model. 
In other to capture some unique attributes of the individual countries that varies 
over a time and might be correlated with the other independent variables, we 
proceed to the third model of estimating a Random effect model. 
Lagrange Multiplier Tests for Random Effects
Null hypotheses: No effects
Alternative hypotheses: Two-sided (Breusch-Pagan) and one-sided
        (all others) alternatives
Test Hypothesis
Cross-section Time Both
Breusch-Pagan 5.13333231... 0.26938670... 5.40271902...
(0.0235) (0.6037) (0.0201)
Honda -2.2656858... -0.5190247... -1.9690877...
(0.9883) (0.6981) (0.9755)
King-Wu -2.2656858... -0.5190247... -1.8519393...
(0.9883) (0.6981) (0.9680)
Standardized Honda -2.0398409... -0.3527495... -6.3523055...
(0.9793) (0.6379) (1.0000)
Standardized King-Wu -2.0398409... -0.3527495... -6.1872757...
(0.9793) (0.6379) (1.0000)






Table 3: One Way Fixed-Model Estimate 
Results estimate with coefficients. 
ZTEA = -1.38652183554*ZGINI + 0.102976104006*ZE_DIVERSITYINDEX + 
0.510361179485*ZINCOME_10_ - 8.37692916647e-13*ZGDP - 0.417038928295*ZUNEMPLOYMENT - 
0.34307481197*ZTAX + 95.9393893274*ZPOVERTY + 0.97364160297*ZINVESTMENT + 
5.73098615273*ZCONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION - 4.98125447914*ZGOVT_EFFECTIVNESS + 
1.61350365741*ZPOLIICAL_STABILITY_AND_NO_VIOLENCE + 
1.41599607015*ZREGULATION_QUALITY + 0.281551852689*ZLIFE_EXPECTANCY + 
2.57900782267*ZQ_EDUCATION + 2.03640978913*ZVOA + 0.238337911662*ZRULE_OF_LAW - 







Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 06/06/21   Time: 06:56
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2016
Periods included: 15
Cross-sections included: 21
Total panel (balanced) observations: 315
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
ZGINI -1.386522 0.238648 -5.809913 0.0000
ZE_DIVERSITYINDEX 0.102976 0.082978 1.241011 0.2157
ZINCOME_10_ 0.510361 0.197521 2.583827 0.0103
ZGDP -8.38E-13 7.45E-13 -1.125062 0.2615
ZUNEMPLOYMENT -0.417039 0.117747 -3.541834 0.0005
ZTAX -0.343075 0.080315 -4.271631 0.0000
ZPOVERTY 95.93939 13.19406 7.271409 0.0000
ZINVESTMENT 0.973642 0.129616 7.511755 0.0000
ZCONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION 5.730986 0.740673 7.737539 0.0000
ZGOVT_EFFECTIVNESS -4.981254 1.271420 -3.917868 0.0001
ZPOLIICAL_STABILITY_AND_NO_VIOLE... 1.613504 0.451379 3.574611 0.0004
ZREGULATION_QUALITY 1.415996 1.166135 1.214265 0.2257
ZLIFE_EXPECTANCY 0.281552 0.214374 1.313367 0.1901
ZQ_EDUCATION 2.579008 0.572875 4.501871 0.0000
ZVOA 2.036410 0.971811 2.095479 0.0370
ZRULE_OF_LAW 0.238338 1.496318 0.159283 0.8736
ZEASE_LOAN -18.02206 2.844867 -6.334941 0.0000
C -0.005381 0.024198 -0.222385 0.8242
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Root MSE 0.237211     R-squared 0.760326
Mean dependent var -0.002032     Adjusted R-squared 0.728312
S.D. dependent var 0.485305     S.E. of regression 0.252959
Akaike info criterion 0.201539     Sum squared resid 17.72479
Schwarz criterion 0.654230     Log likelihood 6.257682
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.382406     F-statistic 23.74962




4.2.2.2 Model 3: Random Effect Model Result 
Since the Random effect uses the Generalized Lease Square (GLS) technique, it 
accounts for both individual heterogeneities, and its time invariant but the 
individual specific effect is uncorrelated with the independent variables. Thus, 
like the POOLED OLS estimate, the results are technically the same with the 
exclusions of the control variables. 
 
Table 4: Random-Effect Model Analysis 
In other to choose the exact model specification that matches our study among 




Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects)
Date: 06/06/21   Time: 06:58
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2016
Periods included: 15
Cross-sections included: 21
Total panel (balanced) observations: 315
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
ZGINI -2.083918 0.182775 -11.40155 0.0000
ZE_DIVERSITYINDEX -0.053338 0.065654 -0.812414 0.4172
ZINCOME_10_ 0.592299 0.175518 3.374567 0.0008
ZGDP 5.51E-13 1.48E-13 3.735855 0.0002
ZUNEMPLOYMENT -0.274526 0.108569 -2.528594 0.0120
ZTAX 0.029904 0.045541 0.656641 0.5119
ZPOVERTY 77.70408 12.66846 6.133663 0.0000
ZINVESTMENT 0.633097 0.107959 5.864217 0.0000
ZCONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION 4.282492 0.687882 6.225622 0.0000
ZGOVT_EFFECTIVNESS -0.446480 0.958638 -0.465744 0.6417
ZPOLIICAL_STABILITY_AND_NO_VIOLE... 0.351082 0.390830 0.898296 0.3698
ZREGULATION_QUALITY -2.213710 0.946346 -2.339218 0.0200
ZLIFE_EXPECTANCY 0.012387 0.201827 0.061376 0.9511
ZQ_EDUCATION 0.166092 0.381872 0.434940 0.6639
ZVOA 4.725658 0.839490 5.629198 0.0000
ZRULE_OF_LAW 1.545353 1.248878 1.237393 0.2169
ZEASE_LOAN -6.070562 1.895873 -3.201988 0.0015
C -0.008234 0.014880 -0.553348 0.5804
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 0.000000 0.0000
Idiosyncratic random 0.252959 1.0000
Weighted Statistics
Root MSE 0.250533     R-squared 0.732649
Mean dependent var -0.002032     Adjusted R-squared 0.717346
S.D. dependent var 0.485305     S.E. of regression 0.258013
Sum squared resid 19.77157     F-statistic 47.87650
Durbin-Watson stat 1.787351     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.732649     Mean dependent var -0.002032




Results estimate with coefficients. 
ZTEA = -2.08391753577*ZGINI - 0.0533384311961*ZE_DIVERSITYINDEX + 
0.59229894348*ZINCOME_10_ + 5.51193123252e-13*ZGDP - 0.274525652147*ZUNEMPLOYMENT 
+ 0.0299042355192*ZTAX + 77.7040793746*ZPOVERTY + 0.633096671047*ZINVESTMENT + 
4.28249216843*ZCONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION - 0.446480096741*ZGOVT_EFFECTIVNESS + 
0.351081550514*ZPOLIICAL_STABILITY_AND_NO_VIOLENCE - 
2.21371007401*ZREGULATION_QUALITY + 0.0123873780475*ZLIFE_EXPECTANCY + 
0.166091660512*ZQ_EDUCATION + 4.72565790064*ZVOA + 1.54535276256*ZRULE_OF_LAW - 
6.07056160624*ZEASE_LOAN - 0.00823370566045 + [CX=R] 
 
4.2.3 Correlated Random Effect-Hausman Test 
The result of the Hausman test shows a non-significant p-value of 
approximately 1. Thus, we reject null hypothesis that random effects model is 
not efficient and thus proceed with analysing of series using a one-way random 
effect. 
 
Table 5:Hausman Test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Equation: POOLEQ
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 0.000000 17 1.0000
* Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero.
** WARNING: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero.
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
ZGINI -1.386522 -2.083918 0.023546 0.0000
ZE_DIVERSITYINDEX 0.102976 -0.053338 0.002575 0.0021
ZINCOME_10_ 0.510361 0.592299 0.008208 0.3658
ZGDP -0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.0570
ZUNEMPLOYMENT -0.417039 -0.274526 0.002077 0.0018
ZTAX -0.343075 0.029904 0.004376 0.0000
ZPOVERTY 95.939389 77.704079 13.593234 0.0000
ZINVESTMENT 0.973642 0.633097 0.005145 0.0000
ZCONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION 5.730986 4.282492 0.075415 0.0000
ZGOVT_EFFECTIVNESS -4.981254 -0.446480 0.697521 0.0000
ZPOLIICAL_STABILITY_AND_NO_VIOLE... 1.613504 0.351082 0.050994 0.0000
ZREGULATION_QUALITY 1.415996 -2.213710 0.464299 0.0000
ZLIFE_EXPECTANCY 0.281552 0.012387 0.005222 0.0002
ZQ_EDUCATION 2.579008 0.166092 0.182359 0.0000
ZVOA 2.036410 4.725658 0.239672 0.0000
ZRULE_OF_LAW 0.238338 1.545353 0.679272 0.1128
ZEASE_LOAN -18.022063 -6.070562 4.498931 0.0000
Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: ZTEA
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 06/06/21   Time: 07:03
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2016
Periods included: 15
Cross-sections included: 21
Total panel (balanced) observations: 315
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.005381 0.024198 -0.222385 0.8242
ZGINI -1.386522 0.238648 -5.809913 0.0000
ZE_DIVERSITYINDEX 0.102976 0.082978 1.241011 0.2157
ZINCOME_10_ 0.510361 0.197521 2.583827 0.0103
ZGDP -8.38E-13 7.45E-13 -1.125062 0.2615
ZUNEMPLOYMENT -0.417039 0.117747 -3.541834 0.0005
ZTAX -0.343075 0.080315 -4.271631 0.0000
ZPOVERTY 95.93939 13.19406 7.271409 0.0000
ZINVESTMENT 0.973642 0.129616 7.511755 0.0000
ZCONTROL_OF_CORRUPTION 5.730986 0.740673 7.737539 0.0000
ZGOVT_EFFECTIVNESS -4.981254 1.271420 -3.917868 0.0001
ZPOLIICAL_STABILITY_AND_NO_VIOLE... 1.613504 0.451379 3.574611 0.0004
ZREGULATION_QUALITY 1.415996 1.166135 1.214265 0.2257
ZLIFE_EXPECTANCY 0.281552 0.214374 1.313367 0.1901
ZQ_EDUCATION 2.579008 0.572875 4.501871 0.0000
ZVOA 2.036410 0.971811 2.095479 0.0370
ZRULE_OF_LAW 0.238338 1.496318 0.159283 0.8736
ZEASE_LOAN -18.02206 2.844867 -6.334941 0.0000
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Root MSE 0.237211     R-squared 0.760326
Mean dependent var -0.002032     Adjusted R-squared 0.728312
S.D. dependent var 0.485305     S.E. of regression 0.252959
Akaike info criterion 0.201539     Sum squared resid 17.72479
Schwarz criterion 0.654230     Log likelihood 6.257682
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.382406     F-statistic 23.74962




4.3 Residual Diagnosis Check 
Test of Normality 
 
Figure2: Normality Test 
By applying the Histogram Normality Test, we identified that the variables are 
not normally distributed as the P-Value is generally zero. Thus, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the variables are normally distributed. The reason for this 
accounted for due to the randomness of the sample data.  
4.3.1 Cross-Sectional Dependency Test 
The obtained results show the presence of cross-sectional dependency among the 
residuals of individual countries at less than the one percent significant value, in all test 
cases. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternate hypothesis. While 
it is easy to remedy this problem if our redundancy test has proposed a fixed-effect 
analysis. But this option is not available for a random effect model except, otherwise 
estimated using a different model structure such as the two-stage least square method or 












Mean       1.48e-17
Median   0.008234
Maximum  2.051373
Minimum -1.736930
Std. Dev.   0.250932
Skewness    0.607260
Kurtos is    39.11086
Jarque-Bera  17134.29





Table 6: Test for Cross-sectional Dependency 
4.4 Empirical Findings and Hypothesis Testing 
Focusing on the main variable of interest, given by the output of the empirical 
model Equation, the results from the random-effects model test indicate that the 
R-squared value (0.73) with a common intercept coefficient which is negative 
and statistically insignificant at p -value (0.5804). This R-squared is the same for 
the pooled OLS (0.73) and lesser than the fixed-effect model (0.76).  
Furthermore, the expected signs on GINI coefficients and the highest income 
inequality of one percent are statistically significant in all three models and on 
their respective apriori bases following Lippmann, Davis and Aldrich (2005) are 
β3>0 and β2<0. These coefficients measure the direct impact on entrepreneurial 
activities of both inequalities. The GINI coefficient is negative at (-2.083918) 
which implies that a fall in the global inequality index, increases the level of 
entrepreneurship activities cetaris paribus. Similarly, the income held by top 1 
percent of the population has a positive coefficient implying that an increase 
income of this group increases entrepreneurial activities. 
Ethnic diversity has a is statistically insignificant to explain the growth in 
entrepreneurial activities as p-value is less than 0.05. We regard the insufficiently 
significant and negative relationship between entrepreneurship and ethnical 
diversity as the Wennekers et al. (2005, 2010), Carree et al. (2007), Amorós and 
Cristi (2008) and Acs and Amorós (2008). Therefore, we believe that β2 (β2 < 0) 
Residual Cross-Section Dependence Test




Total panel observations: 315
Note: non-zero cross-section means detected in data
Cross-section means were removed during computation of correlations
Test Statistic  d.f.  Prob.  
Breusch-Pagan LM 2565.466 210 0.0000
Pesaran scaled LM 114.9350 0.0000




is negative and that the GDP β4 (β4 > 0) is positive. This finding is interesting 
for itself for the direct effect of ethnic diversity on entrepreneurial activities. We 
further this line of analysis and suggest that the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and ethnic diversity depends on the level of distribution of 
income. 
Turning to the point of macroeconomic variables in the model, there exist a  
positive and significant relationship between entrepreneurship and GDP. The 
result shows that increased GDP significantly increases entrepreneurial activities 
as expected, per Deeds (2001) (β4 > 0). Unemployment, although statistically 
significant to explaining the growth in entrepreneurial activities, it has a negative 
coefficient which implies that a decrease in unemployment increases 
entrepreneurship activities. This is expected to have a positive effect on business 
growth as (β5 > 0) in the aftermath of Armington and Acs (2002) and Wenekers 
et al. (2005). 
While the tax rate (β6 > 0) is statistically insignificant. Poverty and Investment 
(β7> 0 and β8 < 0) is significant with positive coefficients. Thus, the quest to 
break-out of the poverty gap as well as the capital formation is assuming a 
motivation for entrepreneurship. Moreover, the sign of β7 is expected to be 
positive in accordance with the terms of Méndez-Picazo, Galindo-Martin, 
Ribeiro-Sorianoc (2012) and Herrera-Echeverri, Haar, and Estévez-Bretón 
(2014).  
From the point of institutional variables, government effectiveness and political 
stability without violence (β10>0 and β11 > 0) is insignificant to explaining 
entrepreneurship activates but the significant positive and negative impact on 
entrepreneurship of the control of corruption and regulatory quality (β9 > 0 and 
β12 < 0) respectively can be due to institutional changes which are slow, 
progressive, ongoing and show patterns of dependency (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; North 1990). As a result, Finland has continuously harmonized since 2006, 




differs inconsideration to for voice of accountability and Rule of law (β15> 0 and 
β16 > 0) which is significantly positive and shows a stronger tendency to 
influence entrepreneurship activities from an institutional perspective. We 
assume a negative relation between entrepreneurship and the rule of law, i.e., β16 
is expected to be negative following the Acs and Amorós (2008), Amorós and 
Cristi (2008), Amorós, Fernández and Tapia (2012). 
In the social institution categories, life expectancy and quality of education an 
individual is not (β13>0 and β14>0) is not significant to explaining the growth 
of entrepreneurial activities. But access to loan (β17>0) is significant but negative 
coefficients poses a contrary theory. According to Petrova (2013), the level of 
enterprise activity is decreasing due to increased goods flow between countries, 
which leads to increased product and service demand and, therefore, to increased 
labor market opportunities. Therefore, we assume that the easy access of loans to 
businesses, i.e., β17, will have an overall negative but significant impact. 
 
4.5 Economic Interpretation and Hypothesis Result 
4.5.1 Hypothesis Test 
4.5.1.1 Hypothesis One 
Following the result of the correlation table in appendix 1, GINI and Ethnic 
diversity are negatively related with Entrepreneurship with a statistically 
significant p-value of (0.0000) and (0.0178) respectively. But the income held by 
10% of the population is positively correlated with Entrepreneurship and 
significant with a p-value of (0.0000). Thus, we reject the null hypothesis in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
4.5.1.2 Hypothesis Two 
According to the findings, income held by top 1 percent has a positive coefficient 
of 0.592299, which is statistically significant with a p-value of (0.0008). This 




increases the growth rate of entrepreneurial activities by 5.9%. So, we fail to 
accept the null hypothesis as higher income held by top 1 percent can promote 
entrepreneurship through wealth distributive mechanism. 
4.5.1.3  Hypothesis Three 
This hypothesis assumes there exist a positive effect of ethnic diversity on 
entrepreneurship, but the result obtained has proved contrary by assuming a 
negative coefficient and insignificant p-value of (-0.053338) and (0.4172) 
respectively. This, we accept the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis and conclude that; ethnic diversity has a negative effect on 
entrepreneurial activities. While this result goes in contracts with economics 
assumptions from a Schumpeter’s viewpoint, the result could have been influence 
by other uncaptured or unobservable effects between both countries. i.e., 
Population. 
4.5.2 Economic Interpretation of Result 
We are now turning to a random effect model economic interpretation of the 
results. Since the results of diagnostic tests show that a random effect model fits 
best, we restrict our analysis to those estimates. The estimated (β3) coefficient in 
global terms is highly statistically important at the 1% rate for the laggard 
dependent varying income inequality of the Top 1%. The positive and 
statistically important it shows the positive impact on entrepreneurship on the 
income of the top 1 per cent of the population in the countries. 
Each model has a negative, but statistically not significant, ethnic diversity 
coefficient (ß2). In those countries, therefore, there is no dependence on 
entrepreneurship or ethnic diversity. These results show that entrepreneurship is 
consistently linked to more inequalities in income. The estimate (β1 and β3) 
coefficient is significantly negative and positive respectively for the revenue 
inequality regressor. The positive sign of the index of income inequality shows 
that greater inequality would promote entrepreneurship. The results corroborate 




impact on enterprise by other writers (Reynolds, Hay, Bygrave 2002; Lippmann, 
Davis, and Aldrich 2005; Xavier-Oliveira, Laplume, and Pathak 2015). 
In addition, in existing literature, our results provide statistical support for non-
empirical claims that increase income inequality promotes entrepreneurship 
(Lippmann, Davis, and Aldrich 2005). One possible explanation is that more 
people are pursuing entrepreneurship, regardless of the nature of their 
motivations, given increasing income disparities, although the majority are 
expectedly driven by factors to improve their own economic conditions (Xavier-
Oliveira, Laplume, and Pathak 2015). Those who advocate greater inequality of 
earnings only by mentioning their positive impact on entrepreneurship should 
therefore bear in mind. 
A further explanation is the need to transfer the funding towards economic agents 
who have better possibilities or have more incentives to save, i.e., individuals 
and/or institutions with higher income, if saving is increased in order to promote 
investment activity (Mendez-Picazo, Galindo-Martin, and Ribeiro-Sorianoc 
2012). It was suggested by Mendez-Picazo, Galindo-Martin and Ribeiro-
Sorianoc (2012) that greater savings to boost innovations could raise social 
challenges. Furthermore, these authors reported that a shift from rich to poor 
could lead to social strains, which could adversely influence the process of 
innovation and economic growth. They also argued that the entrepreneurial 
reaction of innovation reduction might have adverse effects on small and 
medium-sized businesses. Mendez-Picazo, Galindo-Martin and Ribeiro-
Sorianoc (2012) therefore suggested that this negative effect be considered and 
that efforts should be made to compensate the damaged economic agents. 
Governance or quality of institutions is a controversial concept and is not 
understood because the notion is not defined uniquely and sometimes linked to 
concepts such as democracy, corruption and institutions. The existence of a 
proper set of institutions in a country can be considered as good government. The 




evaluate the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship. The panel 
result for countries shows a coefficient (β10) of governance efficiency measures 
is negative and meaningful. This result could be interpreted as follows unlike 
Mendez-Picazo, Galindo-Martin, and Ribeiro-Sorianoc (2012) and Herrera-
Echeverri, Haar, and Estévez-Bretón (2014), who have significant positive 
relationships between business enterprise and management. 
One possible first explanation is the less opportunities for entrepreneurs in 
developed countries with greater GDP. That is, in developed countries, like 
Finland, the market for new companies is saturated compared with that of the US. 
This saturation would diminish the motivation for emerging business, and then 
business in general. 
A second possible explanation is the specific policies and guidelines of country 
leadership that either encourage or impede entrepreneurship. A contract like 
China, for example, has over the last decade managed a transition to a free market 
economy in some sectors of its economy, which could have increased the 
entrepreneurship in their policies. A third reason is that there are more entry 
barriers for new companies in some countries. Such entry barriers can involve 













Summary, Conclusion and policy implications 
5.0 Introduction 
The chapter presents a conclusive summary of the findings study in line with 
economics theory and policy implications. 
5.1 Summary and Conclusion 
This paper analysed the relationship between entrepreneurship, ethnic diversity 
and income inequality. We employed a random-effect panel estimation models 
to examine the relationship using data from both 21 OECD states over the period 
from 2001 to 2016. In this study, the income of the top 1 per cent and ethnic 
diversity heterogeneity are considered through the control of random effects in 
each country and interdependence through the incorporation of a lagged 
dependent variable. This study shows that entrepreneurial activities have an 
important interdependency based on standard tests in panel data econometrics. 
Our analysis also shows that the relationship between GINI and enterprise is 
highly negative, but highly significant in terms the level of economic 
development, with the income of the top 1% of the population. 
Previous studies do not show that these factors are important or have an impact 
on creation of enterprises. We also show that the relationship between enterprise 
and ethnic diversity is negative, and that the income inequality is positive. 
Moreover, we demonstrate the significant impact of investment and 
unemployment on entrepreneurship and the negative connection of 
unemployment with entrepreneurship. Lastly, the findings show that the level of 
entrepreneurship has significant mixed effects on access to loans, effective 






5.2 Policy Implication 
This econometric analysis can provide new insights for scientists, practitioners, 
contractors, policy makers and other stakeholders. Our empirical results could 
have some political implications. 
Firstly, the ability of a social group to engage in entrepreneurship can impede 
uneven ownership of resources. 
Second, enterprise can upset income inequality patterns and can be a possible 
source of individual upward mobility. 
Thirdly, income inequality in the United States seems widespread in comparison 
to Finland. There is an important role to play in overcoming structured and lasting 
forms of income inequality through enterprise-based activities. 
Fourthly, entrepreneurship can play a major role in introducing variations in the 
population and societies of these organizations which represent a potential source 
of diversity. 
Fifthly, the positive relationship between enterprise and income inequality offers 
a disturbing message to high-income countries with highly equal standards that 
aim to increase start-up rates of enterprise. 
Sixthly, policies promoting the equality of income like Finland can suppress 
business activity compared to the US and, unintentionally, income inequality can 
be higher by those favouring entrepreneurship. 
Sixth, the mechanisms for addressing how incomes in inequality interact with the 
business-oriented motivation of individuals and the role of their per capita 
income endowments as well as others, such as human and financial capital, could 
make public policy and private efforts to foster entrepreneurship more effective. 
In addition, because we empirically demonstrate that increases in income 




stages, reviewing a country's economic and social situation before encouraging 
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Appendix 1: Table of Tables 
Correlation between Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
















INVESTMENT 0.657988 0.979881 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
POVERTY -0.655461 -0.979281 -0.997836 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
TAX 0.933782 0.950286 0.871990 -0.868185 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.543276 0.917752 0.949541 -0.965512 0.775286 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary









LIFE_EXPECTANCY 0.096553 0.897005 1.000000
0.0772 0.0000 ----- 
POLIICAL_STABILI... -0.656364 0.205223 0.539679 1.000000
0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 ----- 
Q_EDUCATION 0.996033 0.476188 0.066738 -0.671910 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.2224 0.0000 ----- 
REGULATION_QU... 0.565931 0.979294 0.854061 0.106010 0.533377 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0522 0.0000 ----- 
RULE_OF_LAW 0.558323 0.982405 0.876160 0.138219 0.535555 0.978369 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0112 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
VOA 0.349639 0.962733 0.940122 0.309878 0.314765 0.947696 0.940962 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
CONTROL_OF_C... 0.383214 0.976270 0.942347 0.292185 0.349897 0.953786 0.958652 0.986487 1.000000




Correlation between Dependent Variables Indicators 
 

















INCOME_10_ -0.911016 0.998657 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary
Date: 06/07/21   Time: 17:57
Sample: 2002 2016
Included observations: 315
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)
Correlation





ZE_DIVERSITYIN... -0.133492 0.231037 1.000000
0.0178 0.0000 ----- 
ZINCOME_10_ 0.401907 -0.310922 -0.177494 1.000000




Panel Unit Root Test 
 Summary Panel Root Test 
Variable T-Stat Prob. Order 
TEA 






















































































Source: Authors Compilation (2021) 
REGULATION_QUALITY _𝑖t  











































ZVOA ZUNEMPLO... ZTEA ZTAX ZRULE_OF... ZREGULATI... ZQ_EDUCAT... ZPOVERTY ZPOLIICAL_... ZLIFE_EXP... ZINVESTMENT ZINCOME_10_ ZGOVT_EF...
 Mean -0.000829 -0.004222 -0.002032 -0.030006  0.000178 -0.000938  0.002217  1.27E-05 -0.004459  0.010664 -0.005904 -0.002540 -0.001952
 Median  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 Maximum  0.211151  3.470000  4.750000  1.901093  0.163585  0.240921  0.439024  0.010000  0.552597  1.000000  1.514801  0.900000  0.178218
 Minimum -0.193025 -1.980000 -3.600000 -7.562295 -0.154820 -0.161065 -0.417073 -0.010000 -0.796999 -0.173475 -3.314436 -1.100000 -0.225415
 Std. Dev.  0.022372  0.309338  0.485305  0.517490  0.017998  0.027750  0.067311  0.001361  0.066540  0.102619  0.308387  0.125910  0.030385
 Skewness -1.405030  4.183023  0.577944 -10.31569  0.869842  0.999616  0.406242 -0.743585 -4.131860  7.721496 -4.119528 -1.169845 -2.502387
 Kurtosis  62.98758  63.48460  48.21837  148.0221  46.17303  40.56872  22.19229  37.97070  83.86220  68.53759  52.19713  39.72393  31.06656
 Jarque-Bera  47334.09  48934.95  26854.24  281624.1  24503.55  18577.20  4843.181  16080.25  86716.67  59504.31  32658.14  17772.84  10667.73
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 Sum -0.261147 -1.330000 -0.640000 -9.451757  0.055917 -0.295605  0.698242  0.004000 -1.404492  3.359230 -1.859750 -0.800000 -0.615024
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.157160  30.04668  73.95370  84.08785  0.101718  0.241804  1.422669  0.000582  1.390250  3.306606  29.86225  4.977968  0.289895
 Observations  315  315  315  315  315  315  315  315  315  315  315  315  315
ZGINI ZGDP EASE_LOAN ZE_DIVERS... C NTROL
 Mean 3397  2 62E+10 - 34488 -0 034488 154
 Median
 Maximum 1 000000 8 3E+1 4 000 00 4 0 266279
 Minimum 61200 2 64E+11 3 900 00 3 90 28 882
 Std. Dev. 131 73 1 29E+11 3914 0 39 410 3399
 Skewness 3 095 11 4 685407 -1 024769 1 024769 1 223122
 Kurtosis 33 35 92 24 9 44 73 67 41 73 6 241 37 99 6
 Jarque-Bera 12 96 02 7275.248 65609.1 65609 11 1 149 56
 Probability
 Sum 1 70000  8 4E+12 -10.86378 -10.86378 0 877 1





Appendix 2: Figure of Figures 
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